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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a number
of decisions on government contracts law in 2015, including three
precedential appeals from the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals
("CBCA") 1 and twelve precedential appeals from the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims.2 This Article discusses these fifteen precedential
opinions as well as two non-precedential Federal Circuit opinions' on
government contracts matters, including jurisdiction/standing, bid
protests, attorney fees, contract/regulatory/statutory interpretation,
and contract termination.
Of the fifteen precedential decisions, fourteen affirmed the lower
court or board's decision' while one decision reversed the CBCA's 2-1
1. See Yurok Tribe v. Dep't of the Interior, 785 F.3d 1405 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Reliable Contracting Grp., LLC v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 779 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2015); EM Logging v. Dep't of Agric., 778 F.3d 1026 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
2. See Normandy Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, No. 2014-5135, 2015 WL
7423614 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 20, 2015); Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. United
States, 805 F.3d 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Raytheon Co. v. United States, 809 F.3d 590
(Fed. Cir. 2015); Tinton Falls Lodging Realty, LLC v. United States, 800 F.3d 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2015); Bay Cty. v. United States, 796 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Colonial
Press Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 788 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015); SUFI Network Servs.,
Inc. v. United States, 785 F.3d 585 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Palladian Partners, Inc. v. United
States, 783 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 779 F.3d 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2015); CGI Fed. Inc. v. United States, 779 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015); G4S
Tech. LLC v. United States, 779 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2015); K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc. v.
United States, 778 F.3d 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
3. Allen Eng'g Contractor Inc. v. United States, 611 F. App'x 701 (Fed. Cir.
2015); DayDanyon Corp. v. Dep't of Defense, 600 F. App'x 739 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
4. See Normandy Apartments, Ltd., 2015 WL 7423614; Fid. & Guar. Ins.
Underwriters, Inc., 805 F.3d 1082; Raytheon Co., 809 F.3d 590; Tinton Falls Lodging
Realty, LLC, 800 F.3d 1353; Bay Cty., 796 F.3d 1369; Colonial Press Int'l, Inc., 788 F.3d
1350; Yurok Tribe, 785 F.3d 1405; SUFI Network Servs., Inc., 785 F.3d 585; Palladian
Partners, Inc., 783 F.3d 1243; Reliable Contracting Grp., LLC, 779 F.3d 1329; Bannum,
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decision.' Of these fourteen affirming decisions, two affirmed the
CBCA on other grounds,6 one affirmed the Court of Federal Claims
on other grounds,' and one affirmed in part and reversed in part the
Court of Federal Claims' decision.'
In eleven of the fifteen precedential cases, the Federal Circuit
ruled for the United States,' one of which includes a concurrence.1o
In four of the eleven cases ruling for the United States, there was a
dissent." These five concurrences and dissents were written by one
of two judges, Judges Pauline Newman and Jimmie V. Reyna.'"
This Article discusses these important Federal Circuit opinions
from 2015 relating to government contracts law and summarizes the
facts, holdings, and significance of each.
I. JURISDICTION/STANDING
A. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. v. United States
1. Background
In Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. v. United States," a
general liability insurer brought suit alleging that the U.S. Postal
Service (USPS) breached a contract with its insured by failing to
indemnify the insured and its agents." In 1984, Gibbs Construction,
LLC, formerly known as Gibbs Construction Company ("Gibbs"),
entered into a contract with the USPS for renovation of a post office
in New Orleans, Louisiana, which required asbestos removal and
Inc., 779 F.3d 1376; CGI Fed. Inc., 779 F.3d 1346; G4S Tech., LLC, 779 F.3d 1337; K-Con
Bldg. Sys., Inc., 778 F.3d 1000.
5. See EM Logging, 778 F.3d at 1028.
6. See Yumk Tnb 785 F.3d at 1407; Reliable Contracting Grp., ILG 779 F.3d at 1330.
7. See Bannum, Inc., 779 F.3d at 1378.
8. See SUFI Network Seros., Inc., 785 F.3d at 588.
9. See Raytheon Co., 809 F.3d at 592; Tinton Falls, 800 F.3d at 1355; Colonial Press
Int'l, Inc., 788 F.3d at 1352; Yurok Tribe, 785 F.3d at 1407; Palladian Partners, 783 F.3d
at 1246-47; Reliable Contracting Grp., LLC, 779 F.3d at 1330; Bannum, Inc., 779 F.3d at
1378; G4S Tech., LLC, 779 F.3d at 1338; K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc., 778 F.3d at 1003.
10. Normandy Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, No. 2014-5135, 2015 WL
7423614, at *11-12 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 20, 2015) (Reyna,J., concurring).
11. See Normandy Apartments, Ltd., 2015 WL 7423614, at *9 (Newman, J.,
dissenting); Tinton Falls Lodging Realty, LLC, 800 F.3d at 1363-66 (Reyna, J.,
dissenting); Reliable Contracting Grp., LLC, 779 F.3d at 1335-36 (Newman, J.,
dissenting); G4S Tech, LLC, 779 F.3d at 1344-45 (Newman,J., dissenting).
12. See supra note 11.
13. 805 F.3d 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
14. Id. at 1083-84.
935
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
fireproofing. " Gibbs hired a subcontractor, Laughlin-Thyssen,
Incorporated, formerly known as Laughlin Development Company
("LTI"), to perform the asbestos removal." LTI purchased general
liability insurance, but was unable to renew in 1985.' Due to the
increased price of general liability insurance, Gibbs contacted USPS
for additional compensation." Instead, USPS proposed that the
contract be amended to indemnify Gibbs and its agents for liability
resulting from asbestos removal, and Gibbs accepted the
amendment." The contract amendment stated:
ASBESTOS REMOVAL/REPAIR LIABILITY
The Postal Service shall save harmless and indemnify the
contractors and its officers, agents, representatives, and employees
from all claims, loss damage, actions, causes of action expense
and/or liability resulting from brought for or no [sic] account of
any personal injury received or sustained by any person persons
[sic] attributable to the asbestos' [sic] removal work performed
under or related to this contract.20
Gibbs purchased additional general liability service from 1985 to
1988 through U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty ("USF&G").
Louis Wilson, a former USPS employee, brought suit against Gibbs
and LTI, alleging that he contracted mesothelioma from asbestos at
the post office between 1984 and 1988.22 Gibbs notified USPS and
requested that USPS indemnify it pursuant to the Asbestos
Removal/Repair Liability Amendment in the contract, but USPS
refused.2 ' Gibbs, LTI, and USF&G settled with Mr. Wilson without
USPS.24 USF&G paid $1,031,250.00 to settle the claim and incurred
an extra $529,333.34 in legal fees.25  After settlement, Gibbs
contacted the USPS and demanded reimbursement for the
settlement costs and legal fees.2' The USPS contracting officer
denied the claim, and USF&G brought suit against the government
15. Id. at 1084.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1084-85.
21. Id. at 1085.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
936 [Vol. 65:933
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before the Court of Federal Claims for breach of contract.27 The
court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the case because the
plaintiff, USF&G, was not in privity with the United States, and thus
did not have standing to sue.2 ' Further, it held that USF&G did not
prove that it met one of the exceptions to the privity requirement.29
USF&G appealed to the Federal Circuit.so
2. The Federal Circuit's decision
Before the Federal Circuit, USF&G conceded that it was not a
signatory to the contract between Gibbs and the USPS, but argued
that it was an equitable subrogee of Gibbs." USF&G cited the
Federal Circuit's opinion in Insurance Co. of the West v. United States,"
stating, "a subrogee, after stepping into the shoes of a government
contractor, may rely on the waiver of sovereign immunity in the
Tucker Act and bring suit against the United States."" In that case, a
Miller Act surety was held to be an equitable subrogee of the prime
contractor. The court determined that when, pursuant to
performance bonds, the surety was required to complete the prime
contractor's work and was entitled to receive payments from the
government, then the surety is an equitable subrogee. 4
The Federal Circuit rejected USF&G's argument, stating that a
general liability insurer, unlike a Miller Act surety, does not step into
the shoes of the general contractor, and thus may not rely on the
Tucker Act's waiver of sovereign immunity." A Miller Act surety
guarantees completion of a prime contractor's work by completing
the contractor's performance itself or assuming the contractor's
liability for failing to complete the project. 6 This "creates a third-
party relationship, in which the surety becomes liable for the
principal's debt or duty to the third party obligee."" Conversely,
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1086.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1086-87.
31. Id. at 1088.
32. 243 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
33. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underniters, Inc., 805 F.3d at 1091 (quoting Ins. Co. of the W,
243 F.3d at 1374-75).
34. Id. at 1087-88 ("[T]he language of both [the Federal Tort Claims Act and
the Tucker Act] contains an unequivocal expression waiving sovereign immunity as
to claims, not particular claimants." (quoting Ins. Co. of the W., 243 F.3d at 1373-74)).
35. Id. at 1091-92.
36. Id. at 1091 n.5 (citing Ins. Co. of the W, 243 F.3d at 1370).
37. Id. (quoting Ins. Co. of the W, 243 F.3d at 1370).
937
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USF&G never "stepped into the shoes" of Gibbs with regard to Gibbs'
contract claim against the USPS because USF&G did not assume
responsibility for Gibbs' complete performance, nor did it assume any
obligations to the USPS.3" Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that
general liability insurers may not rely on the Tucker Act's waiver of
sovereign immunity and affirmed the Court of Federal Claims' decision
dismissing USF&G's complaint for lack of subject matterjurisdiction."
3. Significance
This case clarifies that a party may only rely on the waiver of
sovereign immunity under the Tucker Act when "the party standing
outside of privity by contractual obligation stand[s] in the shoes of a
party within privity."40 A party cannot claim to be an equitable
subrogee of a government contractor when it does not assume any
obligations under its contract with the government.4 '
B. G4S Technology LLC v. United States
1. Background
In G4S Technology LLC v. United States," a subcontractor on a
government contract brought suit against the United States, arguing
that it was a third-party beneficiary of the prime contract and that the
government was liable for the amount owed the contractor. The
case arose out of a loan from the Department of Agriculture's Rural
Utilities Service ("RUS") to Open Range, a contractor, for the
construction of broadband networks in 540 markets. 44 Open Range
was also required to secure financing from another entity for the
wireless broadband service.15
The loan agreement stated that Open Range would keep a pledged
deposit account ("PDA"), wherein RUS would deposit funds as
needed during the project. 46 Open Range would request funds by
submitting a financial requirement statement, which included the
38. Id. at 1092.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting First Hartford Corp. Pension Plan & Trust v. United States, 194
F.3d 1279, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
41. Id. (citing Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 195,
201 (2014), affd, 805 F.3d 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
42. 779 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
43. Id. at 1339-40.
44. Id. at 1338.
45. Id.
46. Id.
938 [Vol. 65:933
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purpose for the funds and any relevant support.4 1 Subcontractors on
the project were paid out of the PDA."
Eighteen months into the project, the Federal Communications
Commission suspended the spectrum rights permit that Open Range
needed for the construction of broadband networks.4 9 The loan
agreement between RUS and Open Range stated that RUS could
terminate the loan if Open Range lost spectrum rights."o RUS issued
a notice of termination if Open Range could not obtain a
replacement spectrum rights permit."
Upon issuance of the notice, subcontractors began to worry about
Open Range's ability to compensate them." Soon thereafter, Open
Range fell behind on its payments to subcontractors.
Nevertheless, Open Range was able to secure a temporary permit
for spectrum access for 264 of the original 540 communities." Open
Range asked RUS to advance funds because many subcontractors
were threatening to leave due to nonpayment." RUS advanced loan
payments and took a number of steps to boost Open Range's
credibility.56 Through a press release and two public letters, RUS
reassured subcontractors that the project would move forward, but
the project would be downsizing due to the failure to secure full
spectrum rights.5 ' Further, RUS and Open Range also exchanged
emails wherein they discussed funding for the G4S subcontract.58
RUS and Open Range executed a loan amendment to decrease the
scope of work.5 ' RUS also required Open Range to secure another
$40 million in capital from another entity." In this arrangement, the
capital was conditioned upon the revised loan agreement and RUS's
advancing funds to Open Range to pay its subcontractors, pursuant
to Schedules B-i and B-2."
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1341.
49. Id. at 1338.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1338-39.
53. Id. at 1339.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
2016] 939
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Even after Open Range disbursed advanced funds to its subcontractors,
including G4S, Open Range was unable to pay its subcontractors in full.6
Shortly thereafter, Open Range filed for bankruptcy."
G4S filed suit at the Court of Federal Claims aiming to hold the
government liable on G4S's contract claims, despite not being in
privity of contract with the government." The Court of Federal
Claims held that it could have jurisdiction over the claim if G4S
proved to be a third-party beneficiary under the RUS-Open Range
contract.65 However, the Court of Federal Claims found that G4S did
not prove that it was a third-party beneficiary and thus granted the
government's motion for summary judgment."
2. The Federal Circuit's decision
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Court of Federal Claims,
finding that G4S was not a third-party beneficiary to the RUS-Open
Range contract because there was no evidence that RUS intended to be
liable to G4S." The court noted that the standard for proving third-
party beneficiary status is a high bar and should be narrowly construed."
Accordingly, the court required the party seeking this status to prove
that the contracting parties intended to bestow a benefit upon a
nonparty' and that the benefit to the third party was "direct."7 0
The parties agreed that there was no express provision in the
contract declaring RUS's intent to be liable to G4S.n Case law states:
In the absence of clear guidance from the contract language, the
requisite intent on the part of the government can be inferred
from the actions of the contracting officer and circumstances
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1339-40.
65. G4S Tech. LLC v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 662, 669 (2014).
66. Id. at 674.
67. G4S Tech. LLC, 779 F.3d at 1340-44.
68. Id. at 1340 ("'[T]he Supreme Court has recognized the exceptional privilege
that third-party beneficiary status imparts,' and we have accordingly cautioned that
the privilege of third party beneficiary status 'should not be granted liberally."'
(quoting Flexfab, LLC v. United States, 424 F.3d 1254, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(alteration in original))).
69. Id. ("A nonparty becomes legally entitled to a benefit promised in a
contract ... only if the contracting parties so intend." (quoting Astra USA, Inc. v.
Santa Clara Cty., 563 U.S. 110, 117 (2011))).
70. Id. (citing Glass v. United States, 258 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
71. Id.
940 [Vol. 65:933
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providing the contracting officer with appropriate notice that the
contract provision at issue was intended to benefit the third party.72
Therefore, the court examined circumstantial evidence of RUS's
intent "in the context of the government's responsibilities to
safeguard taxpayer funds and advance the public interest."73
G4S argued that RUS's use of a pledged deposit account and RUS's
press release and public statements about rebuilding Open Range's
credibility showed that RUS intended to guarantee that subcontractors,
such as G4S, were paid." The Federal Circuit disagreed.
The court stated that the PDA was merely a general, standard fund
used by RUS and Open Range for payment of all costs under the
project. 6 The fact that the PDA was used to pay the cost of
subcontractor work, among other things, did not mean that the
government intended to be liable to subcontractors. Further, the
court held that the benefit of the third party was not direct, as the
subcontractor was paid by RUS indirectly.78
Similarly, the Federal Circuit also rejected G4S's argument that the
press release and public letters made by RUS were sufficient to show
intent." While these statements showed RUS's concern about Open
Range's credibility with its subcontractors, the court found that the
communications were never directed towards G4S.so As such, the
Federal Circuit held that RUS was merely supporting Open Range,
rather than taking on any liability itself, and its actions did not
"deviate[] from the scope of its sovereign responsibilities to safeguard
taxpayer funds and advance the public interest.""1 To rule otherwise
would mean that any time the government exercised meaningful
oversight over a subcontractor, the subcontractor could claim to be a
72. Id. (quoting Flexfah, LLC, 424 F.3d at 1262-63).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1341-44.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1341.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1341-42 (citing J.G.B. Enters., Inc. v. United States, 497 F.3d 1259,
1260, 1261 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2007); D & H Distrib. Co. v. United States, 102 F.3d 542,
546-48 (Fed. Cir. 1996)) (observing that third-party beneficiary status has been
found when the government made the prime contractors and subcontractors joint
payees and when the government held payments to the prime contractor in escrow
for the subcontractor).
79. Id. at 1343-44.
80. Id. at 1343.
81. Id. at 1344.
2016]1 941
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEW
third-party beneficiary of the contract between the government and
the prime contractor.82
3. judge Newman's dissent
Notably, this is one of the only precedential government contracts
decisions from the Federal Circuit this year with a dissenting
opinion." Judge Newman dissented, arguing that the facts plausibly
supported RUS's obligation, "in law and/or in equity," to pay for
subcontractor services.84 Judge Newman explained that RUS's press
release and public letters were issued after the subcontractors
threatened to stop work and that RUS urged the continuance of
performance." As such, Judge Newman explained that RUS could
have been liable for services it solicited and received pursuant to the
duty of good faith and fair dealing.86
4. Significance
This case reinforces the difficulty subcontractors have in arguing
third-party beneficiary status in government contracts.87  If the
contract does not clearly state the government's intent to be
obligated to pay the subcontractors, the courts require a strong
showing of the government's intent through either a direct payment
mechanism or an express statement of liability. 88
82. Id.
83. See id. at 1344 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also Tinton Falls Lodging Realty,
LLC v. United States, 800 F.3d 1353, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Reyna, J., dissenting);
Reliable Contracting Grp., LLC v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 779 F.3d 1329, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (NewmanJ., dissenting).
84. G4s Tech. LLC, 779 F.3d at 1345 (Newman,J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 1344.
86. See id. at 1345 (citing Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States, 742 F.3d 984, 990
(Fed. Cir. 2014)) (noting that the case should have been remanded for a
determination of the Rural Utilities Service's (RUS's) obligations on the specific facts
of the case).
87. See id. at 1341-44 (outlining the court's reasoning for denying third-party
beneficiary status in this case).
88. See id. at 1340-43 (finding that the government did not directly pay the
subcontractors and that the communications were an insufficient express statement
of liability).
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C. K-Con Building Systems, Inc. v. United States
1. Background
In K-Con Building Systems, Inc. v. United States," K-Con submitted a
claim to the contracting officer while litigation was pending on a
previous claim on the same project, sparking a jurisdictional
discussion at the Federal Circuit."o K-Con's contract was for "cutter
support team building" with the U.S. Coast Guard." While the
contract completion date was set for November 20, 2004, the project
was not substantially completed until May 23, 2005.2 Pursuant to the
contract, K-Con was required to pay $589 in liquidated damages for
each day the project was delayed." Thus, the Coast Guard withheld
$109,554 as liquidated damages for the 186 days of delay."
On July 28, 2005, K-Con submitted a claim to the contracting
officer, asking for remission of liquidated damages, arguing that the
liquidated damages provision was unenforceable and the Coast
Guard failed to issue extensions under the contract after contract
changes. 5  The contracting officer denied the claim, and K-Con
brought suit at the Court of Federal Claims under the Contract
Disputes Act." In its complaint, K-Con asserted the two claims
outlined in its July 28, 2005 letter to the contracting officer.9"
During litigation at the Court of Federal Claims, K-Con submitted a
second letter to the contracting officer, explaining the contract
changes and asking for $196,126.38 for additional work performed.98
K-Con also asked for a 186-day extension of the completion date of
the contract. 9 The contracting officer similarly denied the second
claim letter, and K-Con subsequently amended its complaint to
89. 778 F.3d 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
90. Id. at 1004.
91. Id. at 1003.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1003-04.
96. Id. at 1004; K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 595, 597
(2014), affd, 778 F.3d 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
97. K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc., 778 F.3d at 1004; Complaint at 2, K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc.
v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 595 (2014) (No. 05-01054C).
98. K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc., 778 F.3d at 1004; K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc., 114 Fed. Cl. at
601.
99. K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc., 778 F.3d at 1004.
2016] 943
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include its request for $196,126.38 for additional work and for a 186-
day extension of the completion date of the contract.co
The Court of Federal Claims dismissed K-Con's time-extension claim
and ruled against it on the merits on the remaining two claims.10 ' The
court held that the liquidated damages clause was enforceable and that
K-Con failed to provide adequate written notice of the contract
changes. 0 2 K-Con appealed the three rulings to the Federal Circuit.'0o
2. The Federal Circuit's decision
The Federal Circuit affirmed the ruling of the Court of Federal
Claims.'o4 It began its analysis with jurisdiction, analyzing the three
claims separately.o5 The court noted that a claim is not the entire
case before a court,' but rather it is divisible by statements of an
"amount sought and the basis for the request."' The Federal Circuit
"treat[s] requests as involving separate claims if they either request
different remedies (whether monetary or non-monetary) or assert
grounds that are materially different from each other factually or
legally.""0 s Each claim must be a "clear and unequivocal statement that
gives the contracting officer adequate notice of the basis and amount of
the claim.""' For the court to have jurisdiction over a claim, the
contracting officer must issue a final decision on the claim.110
The three claims in K-Con's amended complaint were as follows:
(1) the liquidated damages clause was unenforceable, and thus K-
Con was entitled to remission of the liquidated damages clause plus
interest; (2) K-Con was entitled to time extensions under the
contract's changes clause, and thus K-Con was entitled to remission
of the liquidated damages clause plus interest; and (3) K-Con was
forced to perform extra work due to contract changes by the Coast
100. Id.
101. K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc., 114 Fed. Cl. at 607.
102. Id. at 603, 606.
103. K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc., 778 F.3d at 1004.
104. Id. at 1011.
105. Id. at 1005.
106. Id. ("We have long held that the jurisdictional standard must be applied to
each claim, not an entire case; jurisdiction exists over those claims which satisfy the
requirements of an adequate statement of the amount sought and an adequate
statement of the basis for the request." (citing Joseph Morton Co. v. United States,
757 F.2d 1273, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).
107. Id. (citing Contract Cleaning Maint., Inc. v. United States, 811 F.2d 586, 592
(Fed. Cir. 1987)).
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing Contract Cleaning Maint., Inc., 811 F.2d at 592).
110. Id.
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Guard, and thus K-Con was entitled to $196,126.38 "over and above"
remission of the liquidated damages clause."'
The Federal Circuit held that the Court of Federal Claims had
jurisdiction over claims one and three, but did not have
jurisdiction over claim two." 2
Claim one was included in K-Con's first claim letter to the
contracting officer onJuly 28, 2005."' In that claim letter, K-Con sought
remission of the liquidated damages clause."' Therefore, it was
undisputed that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction over it."'
Claim two was briefly discussed in K-Con's first claim letter and was
presented in K-Con's original complaint.' 16 Because it was presented
in litigation, K-Con was required to adequately present claim two in
its first claim letter.'1 7 However, the Federal Circuit held that the first
claim letter did not adequately address claim two and thus did not
put the contracting officer on notice of K-Con's basis for a time
extension." 8 Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that the Court of
Federal Claims did not have jurisdiction over claim two." 9
Claim three was included in K-Con's second claim letter to the
contracting officer, which was submitted after K-Con filed a
complaint in the instant case.1 20 The Coast Guard argued that the
complaint already contained this claim, and thus the contracting
officer never issued a final decision for purposes ofjurisdiction under
the Contract Disputes Act, but the Federal Circuit disagreed.' 2 '
Although the original complaint did include an argument about
contract changes, the original complaint only asked for remission of
liquidated damages and did not include a request for compensation
for additional work performed.'22 Because the remedies sought in
the original complaint and the second claim letter were different, the
requests were different claims.' 2 ' Thus, the contracting officer's
rejection of the second letter's claims was sufficient for jurisdiction.1 24
111. Id. at 1006.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1004; Complaint at 2, K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 114 Fed.
Cl. 595 (2014) (No. 05-01054C).
114. K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc., 778 F.3d at 1007.
115. Id. at 1006.
116. Id. at 1007-08.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1008.
119. Id. at 1007.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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The Federal Circuit addressed claims one and three on the
merits.1 5 On claim one, the Federal Circuit noted the "steep climb
in [K-Con's attempt] to establish unenforceability"1' of the
liquidated damages provision and held that the provision was
enforceable.' The court cited case law stating that liquidated
damages provisions are enforced unless they were unreasonable at
the time they were made.' While K-Con alleged that there may have
been some mathematical errors in the rate for delay, the court held
that $589 per day for delay was a reasonable rate, considering the
additional costs for travel, inspection, and personnel that the Coast
Guard would incur due to the delay in the contract's completion. 2 '
On claim three, the Federal Circuit held that K-Con's failure to
adhere to the notice provision of the changes clause precluded it
from recovering under this claim."so The changes clause of the
contract stated that any change order had to be in writing, containing
the "date, circumstances, and source of the order, and . .. that the
Contractor regards the order as a change order.""' Further, the
clause stated that "no adjustment for any change . . . shall be made
for any costs incurred more than [twenty] days before the Contractor
gives written notice as required." 2
The court focused on the fact that K-Con never objected to the
changes alleged in its amended complaint and even affirmatively
suggested that the alleged change orders were consistent with the
terms of the contract.3 3 K-Con never provided written notice of the
alleged change orders until it submitted its second claim letter, more
than two years after the alleged changes were ordered.134 Because two
years is well past the twenty day timeframe set forth under the contract's
changes clause and because K-Con did not prove that there were
extenuating circumstances justifying its delay in notification, the Federal
Circuit held that K-Con was not entitled to recover under claim three.135
125. Id. at 1008-11.
126. Id. at 1008.
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing DJ Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1130, 1137 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
129. Id. at 1008-09.
130. Id. at 1009.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1009-10.
135. Id. at 1010.
[Vol. 65:933946
2015 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW DECISIONS
3. Significance
The Federal Circuit's decision in K-Con clarifies that parties must
be careful as to the breadth and scope of their claims within their
complaint.'" The Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction
under the Contract Disputes Act over claims that were raised in the
original complaint but never raised to a contracting officer.'
However, the court does have CDA jurisdiction over new claims
raised to a contracting officer on projects already the subject of
litigation." This case highlights the importance of crafting
comprehensive claim letters to contracting officers to preserve the
record for appeal.
D. Normandy Apartments, Ltd. v. United States
1. Background
In Normandy Apartments, Ltd. v. United States,'" an apartment owner
with a Section 8 housing contract with the Oklahoma Housing
Finance Authority (OHFA) brought a breach of contract claim and a
takings claim against the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) for terminating assistance payments and
interfering in its sale of its apartment complex.140 Normandy owned
Normandy Apartments, a Section 8 housing project in Tulsa, Oklahoma,
which permits tenants to pay rent according to their ability to pay, with
HUD subsidizing the remainder of the unit's rent.14 '
In 1992, Normandy and HUD executed a Section 8 rental subsidy
agreement ("Original Contract"), whereby HUD agreed to pay the
remainder of each unit's allowable rent and Normandy agreed to
"'maintain and operate the contract units and related facilities so as
to provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing as defined by HUD[;]'
to clean and 'make repairs with reasonable promptness[;]' to
'respond promptly to HUD's Physical Inspection Reports [;] and to
implement corrective actions within a reasonable time."'" Under
136. See id. at 1007 (differentiating between the claims raised in the original
complaint and a letter to contracting officer based on relief requested).
137. See id. (finding that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction over claims
raised in the letter to the contracting officer).
138. Id. at 1006 (explaining that precluding matters developed in litigation would
impose too rigid a standard and would be too disruptive).
139. No. 2014-5135, 2015 WL 7423614 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 20, 2015).
140. Id. at *1.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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the contract, HUD had authority to inspect, audit, and even
withhold assistance payments. 14 3
In 1997, the Original Contract expired so Normandy and HUD
renewed the contract annually until 2004.'" In 2000, Normandy and
HUD entered into a "Use Agreement," in which Normandy would
pre-pay its HUD-backed mortgage and continue housing low-income
tenants until June 1, 2009.145 The 2000 Use Agreement required
Normandy to restrict housing to low-income tenants, prohibited
Normandy from evicting existing tenants based on income, and
mandated that Normandy maintain its housing complex "in a condition
that is decent, safe, and in good repair, as well as in compliance with all
applicable state and local building and health codes."1 4 6
In 2004, Normandy entered into a renewal contract ("2004
Renewal Contract"), which renewed the existing terms of the contract
between Normandy and HUD, but designated the OHFA as the
contract administrator, rather than HUD."' Despite not being a
party to the 2004 Renewal Contract, HUD maintained its authority to
inspect the premises.14 8
In November 2004, HUD inspected Normandy Apartments and
issued it a failing score."' After Normandy corrected the issues,
OHFA reinspected in February 2005 and noted that all issues had
been addressed.5 o Therefore, in February 2006, HUD stated that it
would close the November 2004 inspection. 5 '
On August 23, 2006, HUD performed its second inspection of the
complex and issued it another failing score.15 2 Normandy requested
that HUD revise its score because the complex was undergoing
repairs, but HUD denied the request for failure to meet the appeal
deadline.'15 In March 2007, Normandy was unable to certify that its
property met all inspection requirements and instead wrote a letter
stating the anticipated window replacement completion date. 15 4 On
June 20, 2007, HUD sent a letter to Normandy that it would cease
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *2.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *1.
148. Id.
149. Id. at *2.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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making housing assistance payments to Normandy Apartments due to
its repeated inspection violations.'
In October 2007, Normandy attempted to sell the housing complex
to Summit Assets Management, LLC for $8 million.' 5 1 Pursuant to
the 2000 Use Agreement, Normandy requested approval from HUD
for the sale.15' However, HUD did not approve the sale and Summit
withdrew its offer.' The apartments allegedly decreased in value to
$5.25 million by 2009.159 Thereafter, Normandy filed a complaint in
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma."*
On October 18, 2007, Normandy sought a preliminary injunction
in the Western District of Oklahoma, enjoining HUD from ceasing its
housing assistance payments.' 6 ' The Western District of Oklahoma
held that it lacked jurisdiction,' finding that the Tucker Act
governed the claim because the requested relief exceeded the ten
thousand dollar threshold applied to Tucker Act cases and, therefore,
the Court of Federal Claims had exclusive jurisdiction. 16' Normandy
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit."
The Tenth Circuit stated that the Western District of Oklahoma
had jurisdiction to hear an Administrative Procedure Act claim by
Normandy for nonmonetary relief.' However, Normandy elected to
bring a Tucker Act claim before the Court of Federal Claims.'" The
Court of Federal Claims dismissed Normandy's contract claim
155. Id.
156. Id. at *3.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Normandy Apartments, Ltd. v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. Civ-
07-1161-R, 2007 WL 3232610, at *2-3 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 1, 2007), rev'd, 554 F.3d
1290 (10th Cir. 2009).
163. Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012) (permitting contractual claims against
the government and granting the Court of Federal Claims exclusive jurisdiction over
Tucker Act claims in excess of ten thousand dollars); Normandy Apartments, Ltd., 2007
WL 3232610, at *2 (calculating Normandy's requested monetary relief to be
$109,575 per month in U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) funds).
164. 554 F.3d at 1293.
165. Id. at 1300.
166. Normandy Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 247, 254-58
(2011), affd, 2015 WL 7423614, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 20, 2015).
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holding that because there was no privity of contract between
Normandy and the United States, it did not have jurisdiction.'
2. The Federal Circuit's decision
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Normandy argued: (1) that the
United States was a party in privity to the 2004 Housing Assistance
Payments (HAP) Contract, (2) the United States breached its
responsibilities under the 2000 Use Agreement, and (3) that the
United States' conduct constituted a regulatory taking.'6 8
Judge Wallach's majority decision responded to the first claim by
finding that Normandy could not bring a Tucker Act claim against
the United States because it lacked privity with HUD.'" The court
held that the parties to the 2004 Renewal Contract were Normandy
and the OHFA, as evidenced by the contract language, which stated
that "[t]he Renewal Contract is a housing assistance payments
contract ... between the Contract Administrator[, OHFA,] and the
Owner of the Project[, Normandy].""o HUD was not a signatory and
was not designated as a party to the 2004 Renewal Contract.'
The court addressed Normandy's argument that HUD was a party
to the 2004 Renewal Contract because the 2004 Renewal Contract
renewed the exact terms of the Original Contract between Normandy
and HUD.'1 2 The Federal Circuit rejected this, finding that the 2004
Renewal Contract was modified when OHFA was designated as the
contract administrator, replacing HUD.'
The court also addressed Normandy's argument that it had privity
with HUD despite HUD's not being a party to the 2004 Renewal
Contract because HUD provided funding, oversight, and
enforcement of the 2004 Renewal Contract.1 4 Again, the Federal
Circuit rejected this argument, stating that "a grant of benefits and
subsequent oversight by HUD is insufficient to establish a
contractual obligation between [a property developer] and the
167. Id. at 254-59.
168. Normandy Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, No. 2014-5135, 2015 WL
7423614, at *4-9 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 20, 2015).
169. Id. at *4 (finding that no contractual relationship existed between Normandy and
the United States because the United States was not a party to the 2004 HAP contract).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at *5.
173. Id.
174. Id. at *6.
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government,""' even when the local agency's only role is to channel
HUD funding." Moreover, the court found that there was no
implied-in-fact contract between Normandy and HUD because an
express contract, such as the 2004 Renewal Contract and the 2000
Use Agreement, precluded the existence of an implied-in-fact
contract regarding the same terms and requirements."'
The court then addressed Normandy's claim that HUD breached
the 2000 Use Agreement between Normandy and HUD."' The
agreement specifically referenced section 221 (d) (3) of the National
Housing Act, requiring HUD to provide subsidy payments to property
owners, like Normandy, that house low-income tenants, and thus
incorporated HAP contract provisions into the 2000 Use Agreement,
making HUD in privity of contract.' 79 The Federal Circuit declined
to find that section 221 (d) (3) of the National Housing Act was
incorporated into the 2000 Use Agreement and held that, even if it
had been, it did not expressly incorporate the 2004 Renewal
Contract, as required for incorporation by reference. 80
Finally, the Federal Circuit addressed Normandy's final claim that
HUD's conduct was a taking because Normandy's right to receive
housing assistance payments pursuant to the 2004 Renewal Contract was
conditioned on HUD's inspections and Normandy's right to sell the
housing complex, which was conditioned on HUD's written approval.'"'
The court found that because Normandy had contracted away its rights
to receive housing assistance payments and sell the housing complex
without HUD's involvement, HUD's actions were not takings. "'
Judge Wallach quickly addressed Judge Newman's argument in
dissent that the government is estopped from arguing that it is not a
contractual party because it argued one position in front of the
Western District of Oklahoma and the Tenth Circuit, and then
argued the contrary position before the Court of Federal Claims."'
Judge Wallach explained that HUD's arguments were not
inconsistent.' Before the Western District of Oklahoma and the
175. Id. (quoting Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at *7.
181. Id.
182. Id. at *7-9.
183. Id. at *9-10; id. at *13 (Newman, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at *10 (majority opinion).
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Tenth Circuit, HUD argued that the court did not have jurisdiction,"
but before the Court of Federal Claims, HUD did not contest jurisdiction,
but merely addressed the merits."' Therefore, the majority found that
HUD did not make inconsistent statements. 8 1
3. judge Reyna's concurrence withJudge Wallach joining
Judge Reyna penned a concurrence to "explain why our opinion
raises troubling concern." 188 While Judge Reyna agreed that all of
Normandy's attempts to recover from HUD should fail, he found it
troubling that HUD was able to insulate itself from Tucker Act
jurisdiction by creating a separate contract between Normandy and
OHFA.'" While Judge Reyna noted that HUD's insulation from
liability would discourage property owners from participating in
HUD's Section 8 housing program, he noted that these problems are
"outside this court's authority to remedy and are best left for another
branch of government to address.""'
4. judge Newman's dissent
Judge Newman based her dissent on the doctrine of judicial
estoppel, finding that the government should not have been able to
successfully argue that Normandy was in the wrong court at the
Western District of Oklahoma and the Tenth Circuit and then argue
the contrary position before the Court of Federal Claims."' Judge
Newman took issue with HUD shifting its position on the proper
jurisdiction of Normandy's claim and argued that this tactic allowed
HUD to avoid litigation on the merits for eight years."' In a sharp dissent,
she stated, "This is not the process envisioned by President Lincoln, his
words carved at the entrance to this courthouse: 'It is as much the duty of
government to render prompt justice against itself in favor of citizens as it
is to administer the same between private individuals.""
185. Id. (arguing that Tucker Act jurisdiction was appropriate in the Court of
Federal Claims).
186. Id. at *10-11.
187. Id. at *11.
188. Id. (ReynaJ., concurring).
189. Id.
190. Id. at *12.
191. Id. at *13 (Newman,J., dissenting).
192. Id. at *13.
193. Id. at *17.
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5. Significance
Like the Federal Circuit's opinion two weeks prior in Fidelity &
Guaranty Insurance Undenrriters, Inc. v. United States, the Federal
Circuit declined to find a waiver of sovereign immunity under the
Tucker Act due to lack of privity of contract and declined to apply
one of the limited exceptions to privity of contract.' Despite the
Tucker Act being a statute that provides "the widest and most
unequivocal waiver of federal immunity from suit,"' the Federal
Circuit continues to insulate the government from suits, even if it has
rights and obligations under the contract."'
E. Yurok Tribe v. Department of the Interior
1. Background
In Yurok Tribe v. Department of the Interior,' the Yurok Tribe filed
suit against the U.S. Department of the Interior for failing to make
payments under an Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act (ISDA) proposal that the Yurok Tribe contended had
been approved.'98 The ISDA states that the Department of the
Interior shall enter into self-determination contracts, or Title I
contracts, with Indian tribes to fund programs that the Secretary is
authorized to administer." Under the ISDA, a tribe that wants to
enter into a self-determination contract submits a proposal to the
Secretary of the Interior."oo Ninety days after receipt of a proposal,
the Secretary must either approve the proposal and issue the contract
or provide written notification to the tribe that the proposal has been
rejected.20 ' If the Secretary fails to respond to the proposal within
ninety days, the proposal is automatically approved and the Secretary
must award the contract. 202
194. Id. at *4-6 (majority opinion); see also Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v.
United States, 805 F.3d 1082, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
195. Normandy Apartments, Ltd., 2015 WL 7423614, at *12 (Reyna, J., concurring)
(quoting United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 215 (1983)).
196. See id. at *4-9 (finding the fact that HUD was not a named party to the
contract to be controlling on the question of jurisdiction even though HUD had
rights and obligations under the contract).
197. 785 F.3d 1405 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
198. Id. at 1407-08.
199. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a) (1) (2012)).
200. Id. (citing § 450f(a) (2)).
201. Id. at 1408 (citing § 450f(a) (2)).
202. Id.
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The Yurok Tribe submitted a "letter of interest" to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs' Office of Self Governance, requesting funding for the
Tribe's Department of Public Safety and the Tribe's Tribal Court. 203
Attached to the letter was a Tribal Resolution authorizing the
request.204 The Office of Self Governance responded that the
correct office for ISDA proposals was the Bureau's Office of Justice
Services and forwarded Yurok Tribe's proposal to the correct
office."' The Yurok Tribe then wrote a number of emails following
up on its "Title 1 request. "206
Ninety days after the Yurok Tribe submitted its letter, it wrote a
second letter, stating that due to the Secretary's lack of response, its
proposal was deemed approved.2 ' However, the Secretary refused to
award a contract to the Yurok Tribe.20 s
After the Secretary denied the Yurok Tribe's claim, the Yurok Tribe
filed an appeal with the CBCA as well as a parallel appeal with the
Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBLA).20 The Yurok Tribe
requested a stay of the IBIA case pending resolution of the case
before the CBCA.2 10
The CBCA dismissed the Yurok Tribe's claim for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, finding that the Yurok
Tribe's letter was not a proposal and that, even if it were a proposal,
Yurok Tribe requested funding for programs that the Bureau was
not currently performing.' The Yurok Tribe appealed directly to
the Federal Circuit.212
2. The Federal Circuit's decision
The Federal Circuit affirmed the CBCA's decision to dismiss the
case for failure to state a claim on different grounds. 2 1' The Federal
Circuit disagreed with the CBCA's holding that the Yurok Tribe's
letter was not a proposal. The court found that the letter detailed
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1409.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Yurok Tribe v. Dep't of the Interior, CBCA 3519-ISDA, 14-1 BCA 1 35,528.
212. Yurok Tribe, 785 F.3d at 1408-09.
213. Id. at 1410-14.
214. Id. at 1410-11.
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the request for and necessity of the funding.15 The letter was
appropriately titled "Yurok Tribe Title I Request for the Yurok
Department of Public Safety and the Yurok Tribal Court," and the
email was appropriately titled "Yurok Tribe-Title I Request and
Council Tribal Resolution."2 1 ' Further, pursuant to the Bureau
regulations, the Bureau is required to notify a tribe of any inadequacies
in their proposals.217 However, the Bureau never did so.2 1 8
The Federal Circuit also disagreed with the CBCA's holding that a
contract could not have been formed because the Yurok Tribe
requested funding for programs that the Bureau was not currently
providing.21 ' The Federal Circuit cited 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a) (1), stating
that selfdetermination contracts could be awarded for all programs that
"the Secretary is authorized to administer."2 2 o The court held that this
definition did not exclude programs that the Bureau was not currently
providing.2 2 ' Therefore, Yurok Tribe's proposal was not insufficient for
including programs not currently provided by the Bureau.2
However, the Federal Circuit nevertheless affirmed the CBCA's
dismissal of Yurok Tribe's claim for failure to state a claim because, as
the Secretary had never awarded a contract to the Yurok Tribe, the
case was a pre-award dispute outside the jurisdiction of the CBCA.
Even if the proposal had been deemed approved, the Secretary still
had not taken the second step, pursuant to the Bureau regulations, to
award the contract.22 ' The Federal Circuit refused to find that a
contract arose as a matter of law and stated that the Yurok Tribe still
had recourse before the IBIA."
3. Significance
The Federal Circuit's opinion explains that an ISDA proposal does
not become a contract as a matter of law after it is deemed approved
and that ISDA contracts are also not awarded automatically.22 1
215. Id. at 1410.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1411.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1411-12.
220. Id. at 1411 (emphasis added) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a) (1) (B) (2012)).
221. Id. at 1411-13.
222. Id. at 1413.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1414.
226. Id.
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Further, it reiterates that a tribe's only recourse after submitting a
proposal and before being awarded a contract is with the IBIA. 2m
II. BID PROTESTS
A. Bannum, Inc. v. United States
1. Background
In Bannum, Inc. v. United States,`2 Bannum protested the Bureau of
Prison's (BOP's) award of two contracts to other entities after
Bannum objected to an amendment in the solicitation.' The first
solicitation was for a fixed-price requirements contract for the
operation of a facility in Mississippi.23 0 Bannum and one other entity
submitted offers.2 s1  After fifteen months, the BOP altered the
solicitation and added an amendment requiring facilities to comply
with the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA)."2 While the
other bidder signed the amendment and submitted a revised offer,
Bannum wrote a letter labeled "Final Proposal Revision #3 and
AGENCY PROTEST," restating its initial proposal and objecting to
the compliance amendment.2 33 Bannum's letter stated that its prices
"do not, and cannot, reflect any consideration for the effects of [the
PREA compliance] Amendment."23 ' Bannum objected again when
the Bureau of Prisons requested final offers."3 After an evaluation,
the Bureau awarded the contract to the other entity.236
The second solicitation was for a similar contract in South
Carolina, which was also subsequently amended to add the PREA
compliance requirement.237 Bannum refused to price PREA
compliance into its bid and stated that it "reserve [d] all rights to
[requests for equitable adjustments], Claims, and Protests. "23 After
an evaluation, the Bureau awarded the contract to another entity.239
227. Id.
228. 779 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
229. Id. at 1378.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1379.
238. Id.
239. Id.
956 [Vol. 65:933
2016] 2015 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW DECISIONS
Bannum filed two separate protests with the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), arguing that the Bureau
improperly evaluated the proposals on each contract, but the
GAO denied both protests.24 o
Bannum filed two separate suits in the Court of Federal Claims on
the same grounds, but with the new allegation that the PREA
compliance requirement and lack of pricing guidance rendered the
solicitation "materially defective."2 4' Bannum argued the solicitations
were defective because they were amended to require defective PREA
compliance, and the bids were improperly evaluated based on that
requirement. 242 The Court of Federal Claims dismissed both cases,
finding that Bannum was not an "interested party" in either suit
because its bids were not in compliance with the solicitations.2 11
2. The Federal Circuit's decision
The Federal Circuit consolidated the two claims and addressed
Bannum's two arguments, defective solicitation and improper
evaluation, separately. 2 44 On Bannum's claim that the solicitation was
defective, the Federal Circuit held that Bannum had waived its
solicitation challenges by failing to object to the solicitation terms
before the close of bidding.245 While Bannum objected to both PREA
compliance amendments when submitting its final offers, the court
held that "mere notice of dissatisfaction or objection is insufficient to
preserve Bannum's defective-solicitation challenge." 246 Bannum had
the option, before the award of both contracts, to follow formal
routes for protest, both outlined in the solicitations, either at the
240. Id. at 1378-79.
241. Id. at 1379; see also Bannum, Inc. v. United States, No. 14-40C, 2014 WL
1373739, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 8, 2014), affd, 779 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Bannurn,
Inc. v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 148, 150 (2014), affd, 779 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
242. Bannum, Inc., 779 F.3d at 1378-79.
243. See Bannum, Inc., 2014 WL 1373739, at *3-5; Bannum, Inc., 115 Fed. Cl. at
150, 155-56.
244. Bannum, Inc., 779 F.3d at 1378-80.
245. Id. at 1381; see also COMINT Sys. Corp. v. United States, 700 F.3d 1377, 1382
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining that disappointed bidders must bring a challenge to a
flawed solicitation before the contract is awarded); Blue & Gold Fleet, LP v. United
States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining that a party that does not
object to a government solicitation before bidding is closed cannot later raise the
same objection).
246. Bannum, Inc., 779 F.3d at 1380.
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agency level or with GAO.247 Further, Bannum did not challenge
these options as "not practicable."2 48 Therefore, because Bannum did
not avail itself of pre-award remedies, the Federal Circuit held that it
waived its ability to raise the same objection before the Court of Federal
Claims."' As such, the Federal Circuit did not reach the issue of
whether Bannum was an "interested party" for purposes of standing. 2
As to Bannum's second argument, that the Bureau of Prisons'
evaluation of the proposals was improper, the Federal Circuit found
that Bannum had failed to preserve those challenges on appeal."'
Indeed, Bannum's sole argument as to standing rested on its
challenge to the Bureau's solicitations.2 52 Bannum argued that had the
challenge to the solicitations been successful, the Bureau would have
been required to rebid, and Bannum could have participated in
solicitations.' However, because Bannum did not argue against the
Court of Federal Claims' denial of standing on its improper evaluation
argument, the Federal Circuit deemed the standing argument waived.
3. Significance
This Federal Circuit decision reinforces the holding in Blue & Gold
Fleet, LP v. United States25 5 that any challenges to the terms of a
solicitation must be made before award of the contract.2 56  The
challenge or objection should be a formal agency-level or GAO
protest, rather than an oral or written objection, to best preserve the
rights of the protester.5
247. Id. at 1380-81 (citing 4 C.F.R. § 21.2 (2015); COMINT Sys. Corp., 700 F.3d at
1382-83).
248. Id. at 1381 (citing COMINT Sys. Corp., 700 F.3d at 1382).
249. Id.; see also Blue & Gold Fleet, LP, 492 F.3d at 1315 (finding that a party that
fails to object to a government solicitation before bidding is closed cannot later raise
the same objection in the Court of Federal Claims).
250. Bannum, Inc., 779 F.3d at 1381.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1381-82.
254. Id. at 1382 (citing Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 166 F.3d 1379, 1383
(Fed. Cir. 1999); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 800 (Fed.
Cir. 1990)).
255. 492 F.3d 1308, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
256. Bannum, Inc., 779 F.3d at 1380 (citing Blue & Gold Fleet, LP, 492 F.3d at 1315).
257. Id. (citing COMINT Sys. Corp. v. United States, 700 F.3d 1377, 1382-83 (Fed.
Cir. 2012)).
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B. CGI Federal Inc. v. United States
1. Background
In CGIFederalInc. v. United States,258 the protester filed a bid protest
with GAO over payment terms in a request for quotations (RFQ)
issued by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services'
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") without
bidding on the Federal Supply Schedule ("FSS") contract.2 ' The FSS
contract was for contractors to review Medicare claims for
overpayment.2 10 If the contractor found an overpayment, CMS would
pay the contractor a contingency fee upon collection.' In 2014,
CMS issued an RFQ for these services, but included additional
payment terms, stating that instead of being paid upon collection,
contractors would be paid after a provider's challenge passed the
second level of a five-level appeal.62
CGI did not bid on the contract.2" However, before the end of the
bidding process, CGI filed a timely pre-award protest with GAO,
challenging these new payment terms.26" Before GAO's decision,
the bidding process closed. 2 " GAO subsequently denied CGI's
protest.2" Three days later, CGI filed suit at the Court of Federal
Claims on the same grounds.
The Court of Federal Claims found that CGI had standing, but
held that the new payment terms did not violate any statute or
regulation or unduly restrict competition.2 1
2. The Federal Circuit's decision
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Court of Federal Claims on the
issue of standing, finding that CGI met the definition of "interested
258. 779 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
259. Id. at 1347-48, 1352.
260. Id. at 1348.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. CGI Fed. Inc. v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 337, 340, 356-57 (2014), rev'd,
779 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
2016] 959
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
party" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (b) (1) when it filed its protest.269
Because § 1491(b) (1) does not contain a definition of "interested
party," the court relied on the definition of "interested party" in the
Competition in Contracting Act (CICA).270
CICA states that an interested party is "an actual or prospective
bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected
by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract."2 11
To determine CGI's status, the court considered four prior cases in
which it had analyzed the meaning of the term "prospective
bidder." 7  In MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. United States,7  the
court held that a party that has not submitted a bid must protest an
outstanding solicitation in order to be a prospective bidder.7
Similarly, in Federal Data Corp. v. United States,275 the court ruled a
party that withdraws from a bid prior to filing a protest is not a
prospective bidder.2 7' Additionally, in Rex Seroice Corp. v. United
States," the court further held that a party that chooses not to bid a
solicitation nor timely protest an award is not a prospective bidder.7
Finally, in Digitalis Education Solutions v. United States,'27 the court held
that "the opportunity to become a prospective bidder ends when the
proposal period ends."280
As CGI never bid on the contract, the court found that it was not
an actual bidder.281  The parties did not dispute that CGI was a
prospective bidder at the time it filed its GAO protest.2 2 The court
held that it was clear that CGI kept its prospective bidder status
during the GAO protest because it was pursuing its challenge to the
solicitation.28 ' Further, the court concluded that CGI did not lose its
prospective bidder status in the three days between the denial of its
269. CGIFed., Inc., 779 F.3d at 1348,1352 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b) (1) (2012)).
270. Id. at 1348 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-56 (2012)); see 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b) (1)
(grantingjurisdiction to review claims of"interested part[ies]" without defining the term).
271. 31 U.S.C. § 3551(2).
272. CGIFed. Inc., 779 F.3d at 1348.
273. 878 F.2d 362 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
274. Id. at 364-65.
275. 911 F.2d 699 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
276. Id. at 702-05.
277. 448 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
278. Id. at 1308.
279. 664 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
280. Id. at 1385.
281. CGI Fed. Inc. v. United States, 779 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
282. Id. at 1349-50.
283. Id. at 1350.
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protest at GAO and the date that CGI filed suit at the Court of
Federal Claims because it filed for relief immediately."'
The Federal Circuit noted that ruling against CGI as a prospective
bidder would negatively affect all prospective bidders." Pursuant to
4 C.F.R. section 21.11(b), a GAO protest cannot proceed when the
same suit is before "a court of competent jurisdiction," like the Court
of Federal Claims.28 ' The court explained, "It would be virtually
impossible to file a timely GAO protest, wait for a GAO decision, and
then file a protest in the Court of Federal Claims prior to the close of
bidding."2 ' Because CGI actively pursued its protest rights at GAO
and, upon GAO's denial, immediately filed suit at the Court of
Federal Claims, the Federal Circuit held that it was a prospective
bidder when it filed this suit.288
Further, the court held that CGI had a direct economic interest in
the award of the contract because, instead of bidding, CGI protested
the solicitation for including payment terms that were contrary to
applicable laws and regulations.8
On the merits, the Federal Circuit held because the payment terms
were within RFQs issued under a FSS contract, Federal Acquisitions
Regulation (FAR) Part 12's prohibition against contract terms
"inconsistent with customary commercial practice" applied.290
Because the revised payment terms were inconsistent, the Federal
Circuit remanded the case to the Court of Federal Claims.29 1
3. Significance
This decision clarifies the definition of "prospective bidder" for
purposes of standing before the Court of Federal Claims, explaining
that as long as a bidder "diligently pursue[s]" its claim at the GAO
and then at the court after a GAO denial, the bidder retains its
"prospective bidder" status.2 12 While the Federal Circuit has not set
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1351.
286. Id. (citing 4 C.F.R. § 21.11(b) (2015)).
287. Id. (explaining that because both a Government Accountability Office(GAO) protest and Federal Claims suit cannot occur simultaneously, the length of
time required to resolve a GAO protest is likely to leave a party insufficient time or
no time to then file a timely protest at the Court of Federal Claims).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1352-54.
291. Id. at 1354.
292. Id. at 1351.
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definite parameters as to what constitutes a diligent pursuit of a
Court of Federal Claims claim, the sooner a claim is filed, the better.
C. Colonial Press International, Inc. v. United States
1. Background
In Colonial Press International, Inc. v. United States,"2 Colonial Press
International, Inc., a small business bidder, brought a post-award bid
protest of the Government Printing Office (GPO)'s award of a
contract to the second lowest bidder after finding Colonial Press's
lowest-price bid non-responsible. 294 The GPO issued an invitation for
bids for a printing order for the U.S. Department of Health &
Human Services. 2" The GPO received nine bids, with Colonial Press
as the lowest price bidder and Fry Communications, Inc. as the
second lowest price bidder.296
The GPO reviewed Colonial Press's past performance completing
federal contracts in making its responsibility determination.
Although Colonial Press was late on only six percent of deliveries in a
thirteen-month period, three months before the solicitation, Colonial
Press had three late deliveries in a one-month period. 29 8 As such, the
GPO contracting officer (CO) recommended no award.9 Colonial
Press subsequently attempted to explain that one of the noted late
deliveries was actually on time.soo However, the GPO CO found
sufficient evidence of non-responsibility to recommend no award.3 o'
Colonial Press filed a bid protest with GAO, arguing that GPO was
required to refer the non-responsibility determination to the Small
Business Administration (SBA) for final review pursuant to the SBA's
Certificate of Competency Program's requirements. 0 2  The GAO
determined that the GPO is not subject to the requirement of the
Certificate of Competency Program and that the CO was warranted in
293. 788 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
294. Id. at 1352-54. Government Printing Office (GPO) procedures require a
determination of the responsibility of the bidder, which includes consideration of
both the bidder's completion of previous federal contracts and ability to comply with
the proposed contract. Id. at 1352-53.
295. Id. at 1352.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1353.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1354 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 637(b) (7) (2012); 13 C.F.R. § 125.5 (2015)).
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its determination."o Colonial Press appealed to the Court of Federal
Claims,3 04 and then to the Federal Circuit.0 5
2. The Federal Circuit's decision
The Federal Circuit affirmed the GAO and the Court of Federal
Claims decision that the GPO was not required to refer its
responsibility determination to the SBA's COC program because it
is a legislative agency. 0 ' The Small Business Act states, in relevant
part, that SBA shall
certify to [g] overnment procurement officers, and officers engaged in
the sale and disposal of [flederal property, with respect to all
elements of responsibility, including, but not limited to, capability,
competency, capacity, credit, integrity, perseverance, and tenacity,
of any small business concern or group of such concerns to receive
and perform a specific [ig]overnment contract. A [g] overnment
procurement officer or an officer engaged in the sale and disposal of
[f]ederal property may not, for any reason specified in the
preceding sentence preclude any small business concern or group
of such concerns from being awarded such contract without
referring the matter for a final disposition to the [SBA].so?
The Federal Circuit stated that the applicability of this section of
the Small Business Act depended on whether the GPO fell under the
definitions of "[g]overnment procurement officer" and
"[g]overnment contract."o3 0  Neither term is defined in the Act. 3
However, the Federal Circuit noted that "[g] overnment
procurement contract" is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 637c(3) as "any
contract for the procurement of any goods or services by any [flederal
agency."3 1 0 The court explained that the term "[flederal agency" has
been defined in different parts of the United States Code as excluding
the U.S. Postal Service, the GAO,3 11 and "the Congress."3 1 2
303. Id. at 1355; Colonial Press Int'l., Inc., B-408031, 2013 WL 1898787, at *2-3
(Comp. Gen. May 6, 2013).
304. Colonial Press Int'l, Inc. v. United Sates, 113 Fed. Cl. 497 (2013), affd, 788
F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
305. Colonial Press Int'l., 788 F.3d at 1355.
306. Id. at 1352, 1356-57.
307. Id. at 1356 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 637(b) (7)).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 1356-57 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 637c(3)).
311. Id. at 1357 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 632(b)).
312. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 637c(2) 551(1)).
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Further, the court noted that the GAO, the GPO, and SBA have
never subjected the GPO to the SBA's Certificate of Competency
Program." Therefore, the court found that GPO was not an
"agency," its contracts were not "government procurement
contract [s]"314 and that it was, therefore, not required to refer its
determination of Colonial Press's non-responsibility to the SBA.31  The
court also found that there was a rational basis for SBA's evaluation of
the last three months of Colonial Press's performance because agencies
have wide discretion in making responsibility determinations.
3. Significance
The Federal Circuit's determination that small business
responsibility determinations by GPO need not be referred to SBA
significantly affects other judicial or legislative offices that solicit bids
for government contracts. 317  Some agencies that solicit bids from
small business contractors, such as the Congressional Budget Office
or Congressional Research Service, are not subject to reviews by
SBA's Certificate of Competency Program because they are legislative
agencies and not federal agencies.1
D. Palladian Partners, Inc. v. United States
1. Background
In Palladian Partners, Inc. v. United States,"' there was a discrepancy
over which National American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) code, a code that determines the maximum size for a
business to qualify for a particular solicitation, was applicable. 20
313. Id. at 1357-58.
314. Id. at 1357.
315. Id. at 1352, 1356-58.
316. Id. at 1358.
317. See id. at 1354-58 (interpreting "[g]overnment procurement officers" as not
including those that are contracting for legislative agencies, such as the GPO, and
are exempt from any required Small Business Administration (SBA)
determinations). The court explains that even if the legislative agency is contracting
for an executive agency (as in this case), the legislative agency is still exempt from
SBA determination requirements. Id. at 1357.
318. See id. at 1356-58 (excluding any agency under Congress's direction from
SBA requirements). The court also notes that its holding is consistent with GAO,
GPO, and SBA interpretations of the Small Business Act. Id. at 1357-58.
319. 783 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
320. Id. at 1246-47.
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The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) issued a solicitation
as a small-business set-aside under NAICS code 541712, which is
limited to businesses with 500 employees or fewer. 2 ' A prospective
offeror, Information Ventures, Inc., disagreed with the NAICS code
and filed a pre-award bid protest with SBA's OHA pursuant to SBA
regulations, asking OHA to amend the solicitation and change the
NAICS code to 541611.22 Under this new code, Palladian would not
qualify.12 ' According to SBA regulations, the decision of OHA is final
and is not subject to reconsideration. 24 Upon OHA's final decision,
the contracting officer is required to amend the solicitation with the
new NAICS code.123
Upon filing the OHA appeal, the CO notified potential offerors of
the appeal by updating the solicitation. 26 Palladian received notice
of the appeal but did not respond or seek to intervene. 27
OHA granted Information Ventures' appeal and concluded that
the second suggested NAICS code, 541611, was the appropriate code
for the solicitation.2 Pursuant to the SBA's regulations, the CO
amended the solicitation accordingly.'32
Palladian then appealed the new NAICS code to OHA, arguing
that it was inappropriate. 30  Under the new code, Palladian was
ineligible to compete.3 Palladian argued that another NAICS code,
different from both the original code and the new code, was
321. See id. at 1246 (noting that National American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) code 541712 corresponds to a research and development company of no
greater than 500 employees and Palladian was qualified under that code). A small
business set-aside occurs when a solicitation only accepts bids from small businesses.
48 C.F.R. § 2919.502 (2015). The NAICS code determines the maximum size a small
business must be to qualify for the particular solicitation. Palladian Partners, Inc., 783
F.3d at 1247.
322. NAICS code 541611 corresponds with administrative and consulting services
and has a small business cap no more than "$14 million average annual receipts." See
Palladian Partners, Inc., 783 F.3d at 1248-49.
323. Id.
324. 13 C.F.R. § 134.316(d), (f) (2015).
325. 13 C.F.R. § 134.318(b).
326. Palladian Partners, Inc., 783 F.3d at 1248.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1249.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 1249-50.
331. Id. at 1250.
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appropriate for the solicitation."' OHA denied Palladian's appeal,
finding that Palladian had failed to exhaust administrative remedies by
electing not to participate in Information Ventures' OHA appeal."'
On appeal, the Court of Federal Claims reversed, holding that the
NAICS code change was arbitrary and capricious because the
contracting officer "blindly accept[ed]" OHA's determination
without exercising any independent discretion. 34 The government
appealed to the Federal Circuit."
2. The Federal Circuit's decision
After first finding that the Court of Federal Claims had Tucker Act
jurisdiction over this matter,3 the Federal Circuit agreed with SBA
and determined that Palladian had not exhausted administrative
remedies as it had failed to intervene in Information Ventures' OHA
appeal."' The SBA's regulations state that "[t]he OHA appeal is an
administrative remedy that must be exhausted before judicial review
of a NAICS code designation may be sought in a court"3' and that
"[a]ny person served with an appeal petition, any intervenor, or any
person with a general interest in an issue raised by the appeal may file
and serve a response supporting or opposing the appeal."33 ' Taken
together with the regulation stating that OHA's decision is final and not
subject to reconsideration, the Federal Circuit held that "any interested
party who participated in the pending OHA appeal for the solicitation can seek
judicial review of OHA's NAICS code determination."3 40
Because Palladian did not participate in Information Ventures'
challenge of the original NAICS code, the Federal Circuit held that it
was barred from seeking relief.34 1 The court declined to excuse
332. See id. at 1249-50 (noting that Palladian argued that the correct NAICS code
for the solicitation was 519130, which corresponded to companies of no more than
500 employees that perform Internet services or website development).
333. Id. at 1250.
334. Palladian Partners, Inc. v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 417, 443 (2014), rev'd,
783 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
335. Palladian Partners, Inc., 783 F.3d at 1252.
336. Id. at 1252-54 ("As long as a statute has a connection to a procurement
proposal, an alleged violation suffices to supply jurisdiction." (citing RAMCOR Servs.
Grp., Inc. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1286, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
337. See id. at 1257-58 (emphasizing that Palladian's argument seeking to apply an
entirely new NAICS code to the solicitation would open the door for any third party
to cite another code designation protest an OHA decision).
338. Id. at 1255 (citing 13 C.F.R. § 121.1102 (2015)).
339. Id. at 1257 (citing 13 C.F.R. § 134.309 (a)).
340. Id. (emphasis added) (citing 13 C.F.R. § 121.1102).
341. Id. at 1258, 1261.
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Palladian's failure to exhaust administrative remedies, regardless of
whether Palladian was arguing for a new NAICS Code.34 2 Palladian
had been informed about the pending NAICS code appeal to OHA
and was invited to comment prior to OHA's final determination;
therefore, Palladian had constructive notice that it could have been
adversely affected, and thus should have responded."' Further, the
court reemphasized that, as a policy matter, if Palladian were allowed
to appeal the new NAICS code after OHA's determination, then
potential offerors could continuously re-litigate NAICS codes."'
3. Significance
The Federal Circuit has made clear that any potential offerors on a
solicitation who may seek to challenge either the original NAICS
code or an amended NAICS code must participate in a OHA appeal
regarding the appropriateness of the NAICS code." As a change in
NAICS codes can exclude certain entities by specifying the number of
employees or annual receipts that a company may have, it is in every
prospective offeror's best interest to participate in an OHA appeal
regarding NAICS codes, even when the prospective offeror is satisfied
with the original NAICS code.4
E. Raytheon Co. v. United States
1. Background
In Raytheon Co. v. United States,347 Raytheon, the initial winning
bidder, protested the U.S. Air Force's decision to take corrective
action and reopen its decision after finding that it had inadvertently
given bidders disparate information.34 ' The Air Force solicited bids
for a radar system and required that bidders include in their bid
detailed cost estimates as well as ways the bidder could reduce those
costs but still complete the contract tasks.3"9 The Air Force repeatedly
342. Id. at 1258.
343. See id. at 1258, 1260-61 (noting that, by failing to participate in the appeal
and later proposing a new NAICS code, Palladian defeated the purpose of
administrative exhaustion by depriving the OHA of the opportunity to apply its
expertise in reviewing the proposed NAICS codes and in developing an
administrative record for judicial review).
344. Id. at 1261.
345. Id. at 1258-61.
346. Id. at 1249-50.
347. 809 F.3d 590 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
348. Id. at 593-95.
349. Id. at 592-93.
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explained that it would scrutinize cost estimates and proposed reductions
to find a responsible bidder with a realistic price.150
Raytheon Company, Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation,
and Lockheed Martin Corporation submitted bids."' After reviewing
the bids, the Air Force sent evaluation notices to Raytheon and
Northrop regarding the treatment of independent research and
development (IR & D) costs. 5 ' These notices stated that the FAR
and 10 U.S.C. § 2320 do not permit contractors to use IR & D costs as
cost reductions on this contract. 53
While Northrop Grumman did not object to the Air Force's
statement, Raytheon did. 35 4  Raytheon argued that the Federal
Circuit's opinion in ATK Thiokol, Inc. v. United States3"" allowed IR
& D costs for research and development "unless specifically
required by the contract. "356
The Air Force agreed with Raytheon's interpretation of IR & D
costs and communicated to Raytheon that IR & D costs were
allowable.35' However, the Air Force never communicated this to
Northrop Grumman.
Raytheon's final proposal included "proposed IR & D cost
reductions" while the Northrop Grumman's did not.' Because
Raytheon offered the lowest, Best Value Assessment, the Air Force
awarded Raytheon the contract. 6
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. See id. at 593 (explaining that both Raytheon and Northrop Grumman, as
part of its cost-reduction proposal, billed certain costs as independent research and
development (IR & D)). IR & D costs are costs incurred by a contractor for basic
research and development that does not directly support any particular contract, but
could benefit multiple contracts; thus, a contractor identifying IR & D costs could
spread those costs across multiple contracts and, thereby, lower costs for any
particular contract. Id.; 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-18 (2015); 48 C.F.R. § 9904.402.
353. See Raytheon Co., 809 F.3d at 593 (noting that the U.S. Air Force told
Raytheon and Northrop Grumman that they could not claim work that was implicitly
or explicitly required by the contract as IR&D costs because it was prohibited by the
Federal Acquisitions Regulation (FAR)).
354. Id. at 593.
355. 598 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
356. Raytheon Co., 809 F.3d at 593-94 (quoting Raytheon Co. v. United States, 121
Fed. Cl. 135, 143-45 (2015), aff'd, 809 F.3d 590 (Fed. Cir. 2015)); see Raytheon Co.,
121 Fed. Cl. at 143 (noting that the Air Force concluded that Raytheon had
"substantiated their [sic] initiatives" for cost reductions).
357. Raytheon Co., 809 F.3d at 594.
358. Id.
359. Id. (quoting Raytheon Co., 121 Fed. Cl. at 167).
360. Id.
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Both Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin filed protests
with GAO on multiple grounds, including unequal treatment
because of the disparate information on IR & D costs.s6 ' After
discussions at GAO, the Air Force took corrective action by
informing all bidders that it was accepting revised proposals and
clarifying its position on IR & D costs."'
Subsequently, Raytheon challenged the Air Force's decision to
reopen bid discussions in the Court of Federal Claims.65 However,
the court came to a similar conclusion that the Air Force engaged in
"misleading and unequal discussions" that prejudiced Northrop
Grumman.3 '" Raytheon appealed to the Federal Circuit.6 5
2. The Federal Circuit's decision
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims' holdings
on appeal, holding that the Air Force violated the FAR when it failed
to provide notice to Northrop Grumman that it had changed its
position on IR & D costs. 3 6
The court found that the violation provided a rational basis for the
government to conclude Northrop Grumman was prejudiced
because, but for the violation, there was a "substantial chance" that
Northrop Grumman could have won the contract." The Federal
Circuit held that the Air Force's decision to take corrective action was
rational because the Air Force's disparate communications were of
"potentially great importance to the bidder's final bidding decisions. "568
The Federal Circuit used the standard of "rational basis," the standard
under the Administrative Procedure Act and for agency corrective
actions, to determine whether to uphold the bid reopening."'
361. Id. In its protest, Northrop Grumman argued that it would have submitted a
different proposal with more cost reductions if it had known that IR & D costs were
allowed. Raytheon Co., 121 Fed. Cl. at 146.
362. Raytheon Co., 809 F.3d at 594-95.
363. Id. at 595.
364. See Raytheon Co., 121 Fed. Cl. at 164-65, 167 (holding that the FAR does not
allow agencies to communicate "incorrect, confusing, or ambiguous" information,
and the FAR requires agencies to inform offerors when it knows that an offeror's
interpretation of a solicitation is meaningfully inconsistent with that of its own and
that of a successful offeror).
365. Raytheon Co., 809 F.3d at 595.
366. Id. at 596.
367. Id. at 597.
368. Id. at 596.
369. See id. at 595-96 (holding that the Air Force was free to reopen the bid as
long as the GAO's determination had a rational basis).
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The Federal Circuit also held that the Air Force violated 48 C.F.R.
section 15.306(e) (1), which prohibits government personnel involved
in the acquisition from engaging in "conduct that ... [f]avors one
offeror over another."" The Federal Circuit interpreted that
regulation in the context of competitive bidding to "require [] that the
agency avoid giving materially disparate information to bidders on
matters that could easily affect their decisions about important aspects
of the final competing offers that the agency will be comparing. "3
The Federal Circuit found that the Air Force violated this
regulation when it communicated critical IR & D cost guidance to
both bidders and then changed its position without notifying
Northrop Grumman.' This cost accounting provision was
important to each bidder's bottom line and, thus, the disparate
information favored Raytheon.7
Further, the Federal Circuit held that Northrop Grumman was
prejudiced by the Air Force's actions.' In doing so, the court first
held that the Court of Federal Claims was correct in relying upon the
GAO attorneys' finding of prejudice because it is presumed,
notwithstanding evidence to the contrary, that government officials
apply their agency's legal standards when deciding issues.7 On the
merits, the court examined the confidential record, which provided
evidence that Northrop Grumman would have decreased its bid if it
had known about the treatment of IR & D costs. 3 7 6
The court rejected Raytheon's argument that Northrop Grumman
was barred from challenging the Air Force's IR & D cost position
because it did not object to it before the contract was awarded.37" The
giving of disparate information was not a challenge to the terms of the
370. Id. at 596 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 15.306(e) (1) (2015)).
371. Id. (citing AshBritt, Inc. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 344, 368-69 (2009);
Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 617, 625, 633-35 (2002); Dynacs
Eng'g Co. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 124, 133-34 (2000)).
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 597.
375. Id. at 596-97 (citing Nat'l Archives & Records Admin v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157,
174 (2004); United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926);
PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
376. Id. at 597-98.
377. Id. (noting that the general rule is if a bidder does not object any particular
terms of a given solicitation prior to contract award, the bidder waives the right to
challenge that term after an award is made).
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solicitation, which requires a challenge before contract award.
Moreover, Northrop Grumman did not have reason to know of the
disparate information violation until the post-solicitation discussions. 1
The court also rejected Raytheon's argument that bidders should
have known that the IR & D announcement was invalid because it
clearly contradicted the FAR."so The court held that Raytheon's
argument could only be successful if it could prove that the Air
Force's position regarding IR & D costs would not have mattered to
bidders' proposals."' Because Raytheon did not meet this burden of
proof, the court rejected the argument. 3
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Raytheon's argument that
Northrop Grumman was not prejudiced because it would not have
taken advantage of IR & D cost reductions.3 3 Furthermore, the court
held that the GAO attorney and the Air Force had "sufficient reason"
to find that Northrop Grumman would have made changes to its final
offer if it had known of the Air Force's position on IR & D costs. 384
Therefore, the Federal Circuit found that the Air Force's decision
to take corrective action was proper.3 8 -
3. Significance
The Federal Circuit's decision allows a bidder to challenge a
disparate communication between the agency and the initial winning
bidder after a contract has been awarded.3" Further, the decision
shows the court's inclination to give deference to GAO attorneys'
determinations of prejudice to the bidder.8
378. See id. at 598 (emphasizing that Northrop Grumman would have not have
known pre-award that the Air Force changed its position on IR & D costs).
379. Id.
380. See id. (noting that Raytheon argued since the law was settled on this
question, all parties had the same information and, thus, there was no disparate
treatment).
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 598-99.
385. Id. at 599.
386. Id. at 596-97.
387. Id. at 596-97, 599.
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F. Tinton Falls Lodging Realty, LLC v. United States
1. Background
In Tinton Falls Lodging Realty, LLC v. United States, 88 Tinton Falls
protested the award of a small business set-aside contract to DMC
Management Services ("DMC"), arguing that DMC planned to use other-
than-small subcontractors to perform the primary and vital requirements
of the contract, thereby violating the ostensible subcontractor rule.3 89
The solicitation was for the management and coordination of
lodging and transportation for trainees at the Military Sealift
Command ("MSC").3 0  The contractor's responsibilities were to
arrange for rooms at hotels, provide transportation from the hotels to
the training facilities, forward any police reports regarding illegal
activity to MSC, provide emergency medical treatment and
transportation to trainees, and maintain a sign-in record at hotel
check-ins."' MSC explicitly stated that the number of hotel rooms
and amount of transportation per day would vary and that the
contractor would be responsible to accommodate all trainees.3 11
MSC also explicitly stated that it would only be financially responsible
for the actual number of hotel rooms used and trips taken."'
MSC evaluated bidders based on technical requirements, past
performance, and price.3 " Technical requirements were evaluated
using four subfactors: general requirements of the hotels, fire and
safety policies, health and sanitation, and transportation from the
hotel and the training facility."'
While MSC received a number of proposals on this solicitation, it
found that none were technically acceptable.39 6 MSC eventually
accepted the lowest-price, technically acceptable revised bid of Mali,
Inc."9 After a size protest, SBA determined that Mali, Inc. was
affiliated with Hotels Unlimited, Inc., which had annual receipts of
over $30 million, and therefore did not qualify as a small business.398
388. 800 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
389. Id. at 1356-57.
390. Id. at 1355.
391. Id. at 1355-56.
392. Id. at 1355.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 1356.
395. Id.
396. See id. (noting that the record did not specify a clear reason as to why none of
the proposals were technically acceptable).
397. Id.
398. Id.
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MSC then awarded the contract to DMC, the next lowest-price,
technically acceptable offeror."'
Tinton Falls filed a size protest against DMC with the MSC
contracting officer under the ostensible subcontractor rule, which
treats the prime contractor and subcontractor as 'joint venturers" for
size determination purposes when a subcontractor "performs primary
and vital requirements of a contract" or is a subcontractor upon
which the prime contractor is "unusually reliant."40 0 Tilton Falls
argued that DMC was "unusually reliant" on its subcontractors to
perform the lodging, which was a "primary and vital requirement[] of
the contract," and therefore violated the ostensible subcontractor
rule.4 0' Indeed, DMC intended to subcontract the lodging services
portion of the contract to other-than-small hotels.402 However, the
MSC contracting officer found that the primary and vital
requirements of the contract were the management and coordination
of the hotel and transportation, rather than the actual lodging
itself.40 3  Because DMC intended to perform these primary
requirements itself, the MSC contracting officer did not find a
violation of the ostensible subcontractor rule.4 0 4 Tinton Falls then
appealed to the SBA.40
Concomitantly, the MSC contracting officer filed an SBA size
protest against Tinton Falls and two other bidders due to their
affiliation with Hotels Unlimited.0 SBA sustained the protest and
found that none of the three entities, including Tinton Falls, were
eligible for award under the small business set-aside contract. 407
Tinton Falls appealed its size protest against DMC to the Court of
Federal Claims, which found that SBA had a rational basis for
concluding that the primary and vital requirements of the solicitation
were management and coordination of the hotels, transportation,
and services.0 Tinton Falls appealed to the Federal Circuit. 09
399. Id.
400. Id. (citing 13 C.F.R. § 121.103(h) (4) (2015)).
401. Tinton Falls, 800 F.3d at 1357.
402. Id. at 1356-57.
403. Id. at 1357.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
2016] 973
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
2. The Federal Circuit's decision
The Federal Circuit affirmed the SBA's determination that the
primary and vital requirement of the contract was management and
coordination of hotel and transportation services and found that SBA
had a rational basis for this finding."'
First, the Federal Circuit examined the issue of Tinton Falls'
standing, namely whether there was a "'substantial chance' it would
have received the contract award but for an alleged error in the
procurement process.".. The court relied on Impresa Construzioni
Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States,' which held that a bid
protestor can establish standing if, upon a successful protest, the
government would have to reopen the bidding process.4 1 s The
Federal Circuit held that if Tinton Falls had been successful in
showing DMC violated the ostensible subcontractor rule,
disqualifying DMC from being awarded the contract, there would be
no eligible small businesses with technically acceptable proposals to
which MSC could award the contract.4 14 Therefore, MSC would be
obligated to reopen the bidding process, either as a small business
set-aside or on an unrestricted basis. Because the court found
that Tinton Falls would have a substantial chance of receiving the
contract if it were solicited on an unrestricted basis, it found that
Tinton Falls had standing. 1 6
On the merits, the Federal Circuit affirmed the SBA's
determination that the management and coordination of hotel and
transportation services were vital and primary requirements of the
solicitation."' Even though the solicitation did not specifically
identify management and coordination as tasks in the solicitation,
and the NAICS code associated with the solicitation was for
"Hotels," the court held that the requested task was to ensure that
there would be enough hotel rooms and transportation available for
trainees on short notice.
410. Id. at 1358, 1363.
411. Id. at 1358.
412. 238 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
413. Tinton Falls, 800 F.3d at 1359 (citing Impresa Construzioni, 238 F.3d at 1334).
414. Id.
415. Id. (noting Military Sealift Command's admission that if the protest were
successful, there was a realistic possibility that the contract would be solicited on an
unrestricted basis).
416. Id. at 1360.
417. Id. at 1363.
418. Id.
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3. judge Reyna's dissent
Judge Reyna dissented, arguing that Tinton Falls did not have a
"substantial chance" of receiving the contract because it was found
to be other-than-small and was not qualified to bid on a small
business set-aside contract.4 '9 Further, Judge Reyna noted that the
record showed two other small businesses with lower bids who
would have been next in line for the contract even if MSC rebid the
contract as unrestricted. 420 Therefore, he found that Tinton Falls
did not have standing, and the court therefore did not need to
reach the merits of the case.
4. Significance
This Federal Circuit opinion allows an unqualified other-than-small
business to protest the award of a small business set-aside contract
when, if the protest is successful, no qualified small businesses would
be eligible for award.2 As long as there is a realistic possibility that
the government may rebid the contract as unrestricted, the Federal
Circuit holds that the qualified other-than-small business has a
"substantial chance" to be awarded the contract, and therefore has
standing to protest.4 1
III. ATTORNEY FEES
A. SUFI Network Services, Inc. v. United States
1. Background
In SUFI Network Services, Inc. v. United States,2 SUFI succeeded on a
breach of contract suit against the Air Force at the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA).425 SUFI then filed a claim for
attorney fees with the contracting officer,2 and after six months of
silence, SUFI bypassed the ASBCA and filed its claim for attorney fees
with the Court of Federal Claims.427
419. Id. at 1365 (ReynaJ., dissenting).
420. Id. at 1364-65.
421. Id. at 1363.
422. Id. at 1365.
423. Id.
424. 785 F.3d 585 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
425. Id. at 588.
426. Id.
427. Id.
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SUFI's contract was with the Air Force Nonappropriated Funds
Purchasing Office for telephone systems on Air Force bases.428 In a
proceeding before the ASBCA in 2004, the Air Force was found to be
in material breach of its contract with SUFI. 12 Thereafter, the parties
entered into a Partial Settlement Agreement, whereby the Air Force
agreed to pay SUFI damages based on its material breach, and agreed
that SUFI had the right to pursue further claims arising from the
material breach.43 0 The parties also agreed that the Air Force would
pay SUFI interest from the date of receipt of any successful claims. 43
SUFI requested attorney fees in connection with claims arising
from the breached contract.4 32 However, because SUFI and its attorneys
had agreed to a contingency fee arrangement, SUFI was unable to
request a specific amount of attorney fees. 3 Therefore, the ASBCA
declined to decide whether SUFI was entitled to attorney fees. 434
After the ASBCA proceeding, SUFI filed a claim for attorney fees
with the Air Force CO under the contract's disputes clause and
requested a decision within sixty days. 3' The disputes clause requires
the CO to issue a written decision on any dispute or claim on the
contract. 436 The clause also stated that SUFI had ninety days from
receipt of the CO's final decision to appeal to the ASBCA. 3
However, for over six months, the Air Force contracting officer did
not respond to SUFI's numerous requests for a decision on the
attorney fees claim.438 Air Force counsel stated that SUFI could
consider its claim for attorney fees "deemed deni [ed]."
SUFI then filed suit at the Court of Federal Claims, seeking
attorney fees and interest. 4 40 The government filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that SUFI failed to exhaust its contractual remedy
under the contract's disputes clause because it did not bring this
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 589 (noting that Sufi asked the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals for compensation but was only awarded "claim preparation and non-legal
consultant expenses").
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 588.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 589.
440. Sufi Network Servs., Inc. v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 140, 143 (2013).
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claim before the ASBCA.44 1 The court awarded SUFI reasonable
attorney fees as well as interest from the time the attorneys began
claim preparation.44 2 However, the court denied SUFI's claim for
overhead and lost profits." Both parties appealed.44 4
2. The Federal Circuit's decision
The Federal Circuit affirmed the award of attorney fees, but did
not award SUFI interest.445 The Federal Circuit also awarded SUFI its
costs for overhead and lost profits."6
The Federal Circuit first found that it had Tucker Act jurisdiction
over the claim and applied common law and not the Contract
Disputes Act to the case because there was no final decision by a
CO."' On the issue of exhaustion of contractual remedies, the court
held that the CO's six-month delay was evidence that the officer was
"unwilling[] to act,"14 ' and that SUFI's contractual remedy, the
appeal procedure, was "inadequate or unavailable."94 4  SUFI's remedy
under the contract's disputes clause stated that SUFI could only
appeal to the ASBCA once it received a CO's final decision.4 " The
CO's failure to act prevented SUFI from accessing the ASBCA;4 11
therefore, SUFI had the right to bypass the ASBCA and bring suit
before the Court of Federal Claims.5 The Federal Circuit also noted
that Air Force counsel's written statement that SUFI should consider
the claim "denied" came long after the appeal procedure had been
rendered "inadequate or unavailable."4 5 3
The court affirmed the Court of Federal Claims and awarded SUFI
attorney fees, finding that, under common law, SUFI was entitled to
be placed in the position it would have been in if the contract had
441. Id. at 145.
442. Id. at 149.
443. Sufi Network Seros., Inc., 785 F.3d at 589.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 592-93.
446. Id. at 595.
447. Id. at 590.
448. Id. at 591 (citing United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc., 384 U.S. 424,
430 (1966)).
449. Id. at 590 (citing United States v. Joseph A. Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234, 240(1946)).
450. Id.
451. Id. at 591.
452. See id. at 590 (citing N.Y. Shipbuilding Corp. v. United States, 385 F.2d 427,
437 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
453. Id. at 591.
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been fully performed. 454  The court concluded that the Court of
Federal Claims' calculation of attorney fees using the lodestar
method and a standard hourly rate was reasonable. 5 It thus rejected
the government's argument that the hourly rate should have been
the rate charged by the attorneys before they entered into a
contingency fee arrangement with SUFI.*
On the issue of interest on the attorney fees, the Federal Circuit
disagreed with the Court of Federal Claims and did not award
interest. 45 To receive interest on attorney fees, SUFI must have
actually incurred attorney fees when its attorneys began work. 5
However, SUFI entered into a contingency fee arrangement with its
attorneys before claim preparation, which means that the attorneys
were not entitled to attorney fees until the suit was successful. 5
Finally, the Federal Circuit, using common law, awarded SUFI its
costs for overhead and lost profits because these costs would not have
been incurred but for the Air Force's breach.46 o
3. Significance
This decision states that a contracting officer's delay in issuing a
final decision on a claim renders the exhaustion requirement in a
contract's disputes clause "inadequate and unavailable."4 6 ' The
delay must show the contracting officer's "unwillingness to act. "462
Here, the court found that a six-month delay was enough to show
such unwillingness.6
454. Id. at 592.
455. Id. at 594 (explaining that the lodestar method involves "multiplying the
number of hours by an hourly rate").
456. Id.
457. Id. at 593.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Id. at 594.
461. Id. at 591 (citing United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, 384 U.S. 424, 430
(1966)).
462. Id. (citing Anthony Grace & Sons, 384 U.S. at 430).
463. Id.
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IV. CONTRACT/REGULATORY/STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Bay County v. United States
1. Background
In Bay County v. United States,4" Bay County, Florida brought two
Contract Disputes Act claims against the U.S. Air Force for refusing to
pay the increasing rates set forth by Bay County on long-time sewer
and water contracts.46 ' Bay County owns and operates Bay County
Utilities, which provides water and sewer services throughout the
county.466 Bay County has had a contract for water services with the
Air Force since 1966 and a contract for sewer services since 1985.6
Both of these contracts included provisions requiring the parties to
mutually negotiate new rates.4
In 1994, the FAR was amended to include two new clauses for
utility contracts.4 6 ' The amendment added FAR 52.241-8, which
states that when the government contracts with an unregulated
utility, parties are required to negotiate new rates (the negotiated
rates clause). 470 The amendment also added FAR 52.241.7, which
states that when the government contracts with a regulated utility, the
government is required to pay the rate approved by the regulator
without negotiation (the no further negotiation clause).
The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement includes
similar provisions.47 2 It applies the negotiated rates clause if the
utility is unregulated or subject to a "non-independent regulatory
body."" The no further negotiations clause is applied when an
"independent regulatory body" oversees the utility.4 74  An
independent regulatory body is defined as "a state-wide agency, or an
agency with less than state-wide jurisdiction when operating pursuant
to state authority. The body has the power to fix, establish, or control
the rates and services of utility suppliers." 4 75  A nonindependent
464. 796 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
465. Id. at 1372; see also 48 C.F.R. § 41.501(d) (1)-(2) (2015).
466. Bay Cty., 796 F.3d at 1371.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. Id. (citing 48 C.F.R. § 41.501(d) (2)).
471. Id. (citing 48 C.F.R. § 41.501(d) (1)).
472. Id.
473. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing 48 C.F.R. § 41.501(d) (2)).
474. Id. (citing 48 C.F.R. § 41.501(d) (1)).
475. Id. at 1372 (emphasis added) (citing 48 C.F.R. § 241.101).
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regulatory body is defined as "a body that regulates a utility supplier
which is owned or operated by the same entity that created the
regulatory body, e.g., a municipal utility."476
Bay County brought suit against the Air Force for failing to pay
the utility rates set by Bay County.' The Court of Federal Claims
held that, under Florida law, Bay County is an independent
regulatory body because it is an agency of the state that is
authorized to regulate utility rates.478
2. The Federal Circuit's decision
The Federal Circuit found that because Bay County was delegated
authority by the State of Florida to control utility rates, regulate
collection and disposal, and collect rates and fees while still being
overseen by the state, it was classified as an independent regulatory
body, and was therefore not obligated to negotiate rates for water
or sewer services.7
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Court of Federal Claims,
holding that Bay County was an independent regulatory body based
on the plain meaning of "independent regulatory body," as defined
by the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)
at 48 C.F.R. section 241.101.480 Specifically, the court relied on
Florida lawj" which states that "a county in the performance of certain
functions is an agency or arn of the state.4 2 Because Bay County was
authorized by the state of Florida to control utility rates, regulate water
and sewage collection and disposal, and collect rates and fees, the court
found that Bay County was an independent regulatory body."'
476. Id. at 1372-73 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 241.101).
477. See id. at 1372 (detailing the county's attempts to recover the Air Force's
unpaid balance for utilities).
478. See Bay Cty. v. United States, No. 11-157C, 2013 WL 5346523, *3-4 (Fed. Cl.
2013) (rejecting the government's argument that the Air Force should have been
able to consult available labor statistics, pricing publications, or requests for more
information when determining whether a rate increase proposed by a
nonindependently regulated utility is reasonable because Bay County was an
independent regulatory body), aff'd, 796 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
479. Bay Cty., 796 F.3d 1370-73.
480. See id. at 1373 ("Bay County has been authorized by the State of Florida to fix,
establish, and control the rates and services of utility suppliers." (emphasis omitted));
48 C.F.R. § 241.101 (defining independent regulatory body).
481. The FAR and DFARS were "written in terms of state authority and
jurisdiction." Bay Cty., 796 F.3d at 1373. Therefore, state law governs. Id.
482. Id. at 1373 (quoting Amos v. Mathews, 126 So. 308, 321 (Fla. 1930)).
483. See id. (citing Fla. Stat. § 125.01(1) (k) (1) (2014)).
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The court further explained that Bay County could not be
classified as a nonindependent regulatory body because the
definition requires that a single entity both create the regulatory
body and regulate the utility supplier."' Because Florida created Bay
County and Bay County regulated the utility supplier, Bay County
Utilities, the court found that no such single entity existed.'
The Federal Circuit rejected the government's argument that the
Air Force should receive deference in the interpretation of the
DFARS by way of the canon of ejusdem generis 48 6 because the use of
ejusdem generis is only applicable when there is uncertainty in the
correct meaning of words, whereas the court found the phrase at
issue was sufficiently-definable through an application of plain-
meaning reasoning.487 Because the court relied on the phrase's plain
meaning, such tools of statutory interpretation were unnecessary.8
3. Significance
This decision reinforces that the determination of whether a utility
is able to establish new rates without negotiation in government
contracts depends on whether, under state law, the entity meets the
definition of "independent regulatory body" or "nonindependent
regulatory body." 489
B. DayDanyon Corp. v. Department of Defense
1. Background
In DayDanyon Corp. v. Department of Defense,490 DayDanyon brought
suit against the U.S. Department of Defense for breach of contract,
claiming that the government failed to order the guaranteed
minimum quantity of Collapsible Joint Modular Intermodal
484. See id. at 1372-73; 48 C.F.R. § 241.101 (defining a nonindependent
regulatory body to include a municipal utility).
485. See Bay Cly., 796 F.3d at 1373.
486. "A canon of construction holding that when a general word or phrase follows
a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items
of the same class as those listed." Ejusdem generis, BLACK's IAw DIcTioNARY (10th ed.
2014).
487. See Bay Cty., 796 F.3d at 1376 (rejecting application of ejusdem generis to this
case because the phrase "an agency with less than state-wide jurisdiction" was not a
general term and would not be subject to overly-broad interpretation).
488. Id.
489. Id. at 1373.
490. 600 F. App'x 739 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Containers ('JMICs") under an indefinite quantity contract.49 ' On
April 23, 2009, DayDanyon was awarded an indefinite quantity contract
for JMICs, 9 2 which stated, "Orders may be issued on this contract for a
period of TWO YEARS ... After First Article Test approval, the required
delivery for product quantities under this contract is 120 days after the
date of the resulting delivery orders." 4 93  The CO argued that the
contract's two-year base period ran until April 23, 2011. `
The guaranteed minimum delivery under the contract was 500
JMICs per year. 4 95  For the entirety of the two-year contract, the
guaranteed minimum delivery was 1000 JMICs total. 9
The contract incorporated FAR 52.216-22, which states:
Any order issued during the effective period of this contract and
not completed within that period shall be completed by the
Contractor within the time specified in the order. The contract
shall govern the Contractor's and Government's rights and
obligations with respect to that order to the same extent as if the
order were completed during the contract's effective period;
provided, that the Contractor shall not be required to make any
deliveries under this contract after Two Years.497
On May 3, 2010, the Department of Defense issued a delivery order
for 500 JMICs."* Pursuant to the requirement of delivery within 120
days of the issuance of the delivery order, the delivery date was set for
August 31, 2010 and subsequently extended to March 2011.4" However,
DayDanyon failed to deliver anyJMICs by the March 2011 deadline.oo
On April 6, 2011, DayDanyon filed a certified claim with the
contracting officer.5 0' The claim stated that the Department of
Defense was required to order 1000 JMICs by December 24, 2010, 120
days prior to the conclusion of the two-year base period. 0 2 DayDanyon's
491. See id. at 739 (claiming the government failed to order the minimum number
of Collapsible Joint Modular Intermodal Containers ("JMICs") by the ordering
deadline, December 20, 2010).
492. Id. at 740.
493. Id.
494. Id. at 741.
495. Id. at 740.
496. Id.
497. Id.; see 48 C.F.R. § 52.216-22 (2014).
498. DayDanyon Corp., 600 F. App'x at 740.
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. See id. (referring to DayDanyon's certified claim for $720,700.00, made on the
grounds that the Department of Defense breached the contract by failing to order
the minimum quantity within the specified time frame).
502. Id.
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rationale was that the contract provided that "delivery orders will specify
delivery no less than 120 days from the date of the order" and that
DayDanyon "shall not be required to make any deliveries under this
contract after Two Years."os The CO denied the claim, finding the
claim premature because the contract had not yet expired.so0
On April 20, 2011, three days before the end of the contract's two-
year base period, the contracting officer terminated the contract for
default.o5 0  On May 18, 2011, DayDanyon submitted the same claim to
the contracting officer, stating that the Department of Defense had
failed to order the minimum quantity under the indefinite quantity
contract.50 6 The contracting officer dismissed this claim, stating that
the Department of Defense was not obligated to order the remainder
of the guaranteed minimum because the contract was terminated for
default before the two-year base period expired.07
DayDanyon appealed to the ASBCA, which held that the
Department of Defense was not contractually obligated to order
1000 JMICs by December 24, 2010, 120 days before the expiration
of the contract's two-year base period." DayDanyon appealed to
the Federal Circuit.5 0 9
2. The Federal Circuit's decision
The Federal Circuit held that the contracting officer correctly
dismissed DayDanyon's claim of breach of contract because the
Department of Defense had until the expiration of the two-year base
period on April 23, 2011 to order 1000 JMICs instead of December
24, 2010, as argued by DayDanyon.51 o The Federal Circuit examined
the plain language of the contract and held that the government had
503. Id. at 740-41.
504. Id. at 741.
505. See id. (noting the contracting officer terminated the contract for default for
failure to order the requisite amount of s within the specified time frame).
506. See id. (noting the claim submitted by DayDanyon on May 18, 2011 was
substantively similar to the claim previously submitted on April 6, 2011 and therefore
denied on the same basis that the contract had been properly terminated prior to
the expiration of the base period).
507. Id.
508. Id.; DayDanyon Corp., ABSCA No. 57611, 14-1 BCA 1 35,616 (holding
DayDanyon's interpretation of the ordering period unreasonable because it
effectively reduced the specific ordering period of "TWO YEARS" to twenty months,
therefore rendering meaningless the clause requiring orders that are not completed
during the contract's effective period to be completed during the timeframe
specified in the order).
509. See DayDanyon Corp., 600 F. App'x at 741.
510. Id. at 742.
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until the end of the two-year base period to order the minimum
guaranteed number ofJMICs.' The court held that the contract was
unambiguous as to the timeframe that the Department of Defense
had to issue orders.' The contract stated that "'orders may be
issued' from the 'DATE OF CONTRACT AWARD [April 23, 2009]'
through 'TWO (2) YEARS[,] "' April 23, 2011.113
The Federal Circuit noted that the contract was ambiguous, as FAR
52.216-22(d) stated that DayDanyon was required to complete any
order within 120 days while also stating that DayDanyon "shall not be
required to make any deliveries under this contract after Two
Years."' However, the Federal Circuit did not resolve this ambiguity,
as it found that any interpretation of FAR 52.216-22(d) would not
change the ordering period under the contract. 15
Regardless of "whether or not DayDanyon was obligated to deliver
beyond the two-year period," the court held that the ordering period
of two years was unambiguously stated in the contract and, thus, the
government had until the expiration of that two-year base period on
April 23, 2011 to order the guaranteed minimum amount ofJMICs as
required by the contract.5 16 Therefore, as the Department of Defense
did not have an obligation to issue orders for the guaranteed
minimum by December 24, 2010, the Federal Circuit held that the
CO correctly dismissed DayDanyon's claim.1
3. Significance
While not precedential, this Federal Circuit case further reinforces
the court's reliance on the plain meaning of contract provisions to
resolve claims, even when that clear and unambiguous contract
provision is logically incompatible with another contract provision." In
511. Id. (citing Bell/Heery v. United States, 739 F.3d 1324, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
512. Id.
513. Id.; see 48 C.F.R. § 52.216-18 (2014).
514. See DayDanyon Corp., 600 F. App'x at 742 (explaining that 48 C.F.R. § 52.216-
22(d) can be interpreted either as stating that DayDanyon need not deliver orders that
were placed after April 23, 2011 or as stating that the government may place orders with
DayDanyon at any time during the two-year ordering period but that DayDanyon is not
required to make any deliveries placed within 120 days of April 23, 2011).
515. DayDanyon Corp., 600 F. App'x at 742; see 48 C.F.R. § 52.216-22.
516. DayDanyon Corp., 600 F. App'x at 742 (noting from the plain language of the
contract that the government had two years from the contract award date to order
the guaranteed minimum number ofJMICs).
517. Id.
518. See id. (opting not to address the issue of the logically incompatible contract
provision because it centered on the non-issue of duty to deliver on behalf of
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these situations, contractors should carefully examine their contracts to
determine when a contract provision is breached and, consequently,
when it has a claim against the government Failure to do so will lead to
dismissal of the claim on the plain language of the contract.
C. Reliable Contracting Group, LLC v. Department of Veterans
Affairs
1. Background
In Reliable Contracting Group, LLC v. Department of Veterans Affairs,519
Reliable Contracting Group brought a claim for an equitable
adjustment when the VA rejected three backup generators for not
being "new" as required under the contract.5 0 The contract at
section 1.47 required that the backup generators be "new and of the
most suitable grade for the purpose intended, unless otherwise
specifically provided in this contract.""' While "new" was not defined
in section 1.47, "new" is defined as "composed of previously unused
components" pursuant to FAR 52.211-5, which was incorporated into
the contract by reference.2
Reliable's sub-subcontractor delivered three backup generators to
the site, two of which were described by the VA's senior resident
engineer as "show [ing] a lot of wear and tear including field burns to
enlarge mounting holes." 2 ' Reliable's subcontractor further stated
that the units were in "BAD CONDITION."5 2 4
However, after examination of the units, Reliable and its
subcontractor concluded that the generators were previously
purchased by other entities, but never used. 25 The VA nevertheless
refused to accept these generators, and Reliable's subcontractor
acquired three different generators, which the VA accepted and
DayDanyon as opposed to the claim against the government for failure to order the
minimum quantity ofJMICs within the argued time frame of the contract).
519. 779 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
520. Id. at 1330.
521. Id.
522. See id. (citing 48 C.F.R. § 52.211-5 (2015)).
523. See id. at 1331 (stating that Reliable hired a sub-contractor, Fisk Electric Co.,
to procure the electrical generators, which then contracted with DTE Energy
Technologies to provide the generators).
524. See id. (reviewing letters between Reliable, its subcontractor, its sub-
subcontractor, and the VA's senior resident engineer and finding that all initially
agreed that the generators' condition failed to meet contract specifications).
525. Id.
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installed.'" Reliable then filed a claim for an equitable adjustment,
which was denied, and appealed the decision to the CBCA.52 1
The CBA held that the backup generators were not "new" pursuant
to FAR 52.211-5, because they did not "meet contract
requirements. "528 The contract stated that generators must have
been "capable of being tested at the factory." 2' The CBA held that
generators issued by a factory in 2000 were incapable of being factory
tested in 2004 and thus were not "new."5 0 Reliable then appealed
directly to the Federal Circuit."'
2. The Federal Circuit's decision
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the CBA's decision
regarding contract interpretation de novo and its factual
determinations for "substantial evidence.""5 2 The seminal issue was
whether the three backup generators met the contractual
requirement that they be "new."53 3
The Federal Circuit disregarded the definition of "new" listed
under section 1.79 of the contract.5 Instead, it focused on industry
standards and the dictionary definition of the word to hold that
"new" meant a "fresh condition."3 5  However, because there was
conflicting evidence as to the amount of damage to the generators,
the court remanded the case back to the CBCA to determine the
526. See id. (explaining that the VA's senior resident engineer rejected the
generators delivered by Reliable's sub-subcontractor because "previous ownership
makes them used").
527. Id. (explaining that Reliable sought approximately $1,100,000 from the VA
for expenses incurred when the VA rejected the three original generators).
528. Id. at 1331-32 (citing Reliable Contracting Grp., LLC v. Dep't of Veterans
Affairs, CBCA 3048, 14-1 BCA 135,475); 48 C.F.R. § 52.211-5 (2015).
529. Id. at 1331 (arguing the incapability of being factory-tested makes the
generators not "new").
530. Id. at 1332 (citing Reliable Contracting Grp., CBCA 3048, 14-1 BCA 1 35,475,
which reasoned that because the contract required the government have the option
of being able to witness the generators be factory-tested and Reliable knew this,
Reliable could not argue they were "new" when the generators had been sitting in
storage for four years and were no longer located at the factory, therefore they were
unable to be factory tested).
531. Id. at 1331.
532. Id. (citing Rockies Express Pipeline LLC v. Salazar, 730 F.3d 1330, 1335-36
(Fed. Cir. 2013)).
533. Id.
534. Id. at 1332.
535. Id. at 1334.
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extent of the disputed damage and whether any such damage could
have been remedied to meet the court's definition of "new." 536
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the CBCA's holding that "new"
meant "capable of being tested at the factory.",1 7  First, the court
explained that this definition of "new" did not match the VA's
contemporaneous construction of the contract because the VA never
argued that the reason the generators were not "new" was because
they were incapable of factory testing. 3 1 Second, the court stated
that although the contract required the generators to be factory tested,
the contract did not specify when the testing had to be done or if it had
to be done independent of a request by the government.5 39
The Federal Circuit examined the contract and noted two separate
provisions of the contract using the word "new."540 Section 1.47 stated
that the generator itself must be "new" but failed to define "new. "541
Section 1.79 defined "new" as being comprised of unused generator
parts. 542 Because "[i] t is a fundamental rule of contract interpretation
that the provisions are viewed in the way that gives meaning to all parts
of the contract," the Federal Circuit refused to accept that the
definition of "new" in section 1.79 applied to section 1.47.*4
Instead, finding the definition of "new" in section 1.47 ambiguous,
the court adopted a wholly different interpretation of "new" in the
contract based on dictionary definitions and industry standards."
536. Id. at 1335.
537. Id. at 1331-32.
538. See id. at 1332 (noting that a party's contemporaneous belief about the
meaning of terms in a contract is usually probative or indicative of the meaning of a
the term).
539. See id. (noting that the generators were later tested by factory-certified
technicians, but that the VA declined to observe the testing; therefore, there was no
indication that the generators were incapable of factory testing if the government
had requested it).
540. See id. at 1333 (observing that section 1.79's "new" requirement is meant to
describe the quality of the "components" in the machine, while section 1.47's
"new" requirement refers to the whole machine, not just its component parts;
therefore "there is not justification for treating a generator as new solely because it
has not been used").
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. See id. (citing Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. United States, 129 F.3d 1226, 1231
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that this fundamental rule helps to avoid confusion, conflict
of contractual clauses, redundancy, and surplusage).
544. Id. at 1333 (citing C.A. Acquisition Newco, LLC v. DHL Express (USA), Inc.,
696 F.3d 109, 113-14 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
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The court interpreted "new" to mean in "fresh condition." 54 5
Therefore, "new" required that the generators "not be used and ...
be free of significant damage, i.e., damage that is not cosmetic."546
In analyzing the facts on the record, the Federal Circuit found that
the admissions made by Reliable, its subcontractor, and its sub-
subcontractor regarding the state of the backup generators were not
binding but probative of the fact that the generators were not
"new." 547 However, because there was an affidavit from Reliable's
subcontractor's Executive Vice President, stating that any damage to
the backup generators was merely cosmetic, the Federal Circuit
found that there was conflicting evidence as to the amount of
damage.54 8 Given that the CBCA's fact-finding did not include the
extent of the damage to the backup generators or evidence of whether
the damage could be "fully and easily cured," the Federal Circuit
remanded the case back to the CBCA to determine whether the backup
generators met the Federal Circuit's interpretation of "new."'
3. judge Newman's dissent
Judge Newman dissented based on the standard of the Federal
Circuit's review.5  Pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 7107(b), the CBCA's
findings of fact are final unless "fraudulent, or arbitrary, or
capricious, or so grossly erroneous as to necessarily imply bad faith,
or... [un]supported by substantial evidence.""' Judge Newman
stated that the CBCA did not err in relying on Reliable's statements
that the generators were unacceptable and the subcontractors'
refusal to certify the generators as new.' Further, Judge Newman
disagreed with the majority's definition of "new" in government
545. Id. at 1334 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcrlONARY 1522
(2002)).
546. Id.
547. Id. at 1334-35.
548. See id. at 1335 (asserting that the cosmetic damage to the generators,
consisting of dust, dirt, grime, rust, scraped paint, and/or disconnected hoses did
not affect the quality of the generators).
549. Id.
550. Id. at 1336 (Newman, J., dissenting). See generally 41 U.S.C. § 7107(b) (2012)
(formerly 41 U.S.C. § 609(b)) (stating the arbitrary and capricious standard of review).
551. Reliable Contracting Grp., LLC, 779 F.3d at 1336 (citing 41 U.S.C. § 609(b)
(1982) (now codified at 41 U.S.C. § 7107(b))).
552. See id. (arguing that the majority had no basis for excluding the evidence of
admissions on behalf of Reliable, its subcontractor, and its sub-subcontractor even
though the admissions were not made in formal court documents).
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contracts.5 1 She characterized the majority's definition of "new" as
including "previously owned and damaged equipment if the damage
'can be fully and easily cured."'"" However, she stated that "[o]ld
and damaged equipment does not become new if the damage can be
cured."" Therefore, Judge Newman argued that the CBCA's denial
of an equitable adjustment was correct. 6
4. Significance
While the Federal Circuit's decision in Reliable Contracting
concerned the interpretation of "new" in Reliable's contract with the
VA, the holding applies to all definitions of "new" within
government contracts and under the FAR.55' Any future
contracts with no definition or an ambiguous definition of "new"
will be subject to the Federal Circuit's determination that "new"
means "fresh condition.
V. CONTRACT TERMINATION
A. Allen Engineering Contractor Inc. v. United States
1. Background
In Allen Engineering Contractor Inc. v. United States,"' Allen
Engineering Contractor Inc. ("AECI") argued that it was improperly
terminated after replacement payment and performance bonds
approved by the U.S. Department of the Navy were found to be
fraudulent. " AECI had three separate construction contracts with
the United States, and each contract was well over the bond
threshold of $150,000."'
Pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 3131, AECI was required to obtain
performance and payment bonds for 100 percent of the contract
553. Id.
554. Id. (citing id. at 1335 (majority opinion)).
555. See id. (arguing that the VA has no legal or equitable obligation to prove that
the "nonconforming" generators can be refurbished and thus, the costs of
contractual compliance are not the VA's burden to bear).
556. Id.
557. See id. (criticizing the majority's definition of the term "new" in government
contracts and under the FAR).
558. See id. at 1334 (majority opinion) (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1522 (2002)).
559. 611 F. App'x 701 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
560. Id. at 703.
561. Id. at 703-04.
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price.56" Regulations state that "bonds shall be in the form of firm
commitment, supported by corporate sureties whose names appear
on the list contained in Treasury Department Circular 570."153
Performance bonds are designed to protect the government if a
contractor defaults and leaves the government with an incomplete
project.564  Payment bonds are designed to protect contractors and
subcontractors that provide labor or materials on a project.566
In accordance with this requirement, AECI provided performance and
payment bonds through Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.6 The
Navy approved the bonds, and AECI started work on the three projects.5 6 1
However, during the project, AECI wanted to replace the bonds
with bonds from Pacific Indemnity Company ("PIC").' The Navy
investigated the PIC bonds and agreed to replace the Liberty Mutual
bonds with PIC bonds on AECI's projects.5 ' Two months later, PIC
alerted AECI and the Navy that the supposed-PIC bonds on AECI's
projects were actually fraudulent and were never issued by PIC.570
Therefore, both the performance bonds and payment bonds on
AECI's three projects were invalid.
The Navy suspended work on AECI's projects and requested that AECI
find replacement bonds.572 When AECI was unable to secure
replacement bonds, the Navy terminated all three contracts for default 57
AECI brought suit against the Navy, arguing that the
terminations should have been terminations for convenience.
The Court of Federal Claims held that AECI failed to state a claim
on which relief could be granted and dismissed the case.57 5 AECI
appealed to the Federal Circuit.57 6
562. Id. (citing 40 U.S.C. § 3131 (2012)).
563. See id. at 704 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-15(d) (2015)).
564. See id. (citing Dependable Ins. Co. v. United States, 846 F.2d 65,66 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
565. See id. (citing J.W. Bateson Co. v. United States ex rel. Bd. of Trs. of Nat'l
Automatic Sprinkler Indus. Pension Fund, 434 U.S. 586, 587 (1978)).
566. Id.
567. Id.
568. Id.
569. Id.
570. Id.
571. Id.
572. Id.
573. Id.
574. Id.; Allen Eng'g Contractor Inc. v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 457, 459-60
(2014), affd, 611 F. App'x 701 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
575. Allen Eng'g Contractor Inc., 611 F. App'x at 704; Allen Eng'g Contractor Inc., 115
Fed. Cl. at 469.
576. Allen Eng'g Contractor Inc., 611 F. App'x at 705.
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2. The Federal Circuit's decision
The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the Navy properly
terminated AECI's three contracts for default.57 7  Pursuant to 48
C.F.R. section 52.249.10 (a), the government can terminate a contract
for default when a contractor "refuses or fails to prosecute []
work. . . with the diligence that will insure its completion within the
time specified in [a] contract.""'
The Federal Circuit noted government COs' broad discretion
when terminating contracts. 5 9 The court agreed with the Navy's
contracting officer, holding that AECI's failure to furnish
replacement bonds was a material breach of the contract justifying
termination for default.so Since AECI was prohibited from contract
performance without valid replacement bonds, its inability to obtain
replacement bonds was a "fail[ure] to prosecute work. . . with the
diligence that will insure its completion within the time specified in
[a] contract."5 1 Merely furnishing bonds at the commencement of
contract work was insufficient.5 8 1
AECI argued that default should be excused since the Navy's
investigation and subsequent approval of the fraudulent bonds
contributed to AECI's material breach.' Alternatively, AECI argued
that the Navy's failure to discover that the bonds were fraudulent was
a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.584 The
Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that AECI could not be excused
by the Navy's failure, as contractors are in control of the bonds, and
bonds exist for the benefit of the government and subcontractors.8 5
Further, the court held that the Navy did not violate the implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing because AECI provided no evidence
that the Navy knew the bonds were fraudulent before its
investigation.' Therefore, because AECI was solely responsible for
maintaining performance and payment bonds on its projects and
577. Id. at 705, 709.
578. Id. at 705; 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-10(a) (2015).
579. Allen Eng'g Contractor Inc., 611 F. App'x at 705 (quoting Lanterman v. United
States, 75 Fed. Cl. 731, 733 (2007)).
580. See id. ("[F]ailure to furnish adequate bonding... is a material breach that
justifies termination for default." (citing Airport Indus. Park, Inc. v. United States, 59
Fed. Cl. 332, 334 (2004))).
581. Id.
582. Id. at 707.
583. Id.
584. Id. at 707, 709.
585. Id. at 707-09.
586. Id. at 709.
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failed to do so, prohibiting it from continuing work, the Navy
correctly terminated AECI for default.58 7
3. Significance
This decision reinforces that contractors are solely responsible for
ensuring that any necessary payment and performance bonds on a
project are valid and enforceable." The Federal Circuit is clear that
a contractor's inability or even delay in finding replacement bonds is
justification for a termination for default.8 "
B. EM Logging v. Department of Agriculture
1. Background
In EM Logging v. Department of Agriculture,"o EM Logging objected
to the U.S. Forest Service's termination of its timber sale contract on
grounds that it had demonstrated "flagrant disregard" for the terms
of the contract."' The contract was for a timber sale in the Kootenai
National Forest in Montana.5 ' The Forest Service accused EM
Logging of violating a number of the contract provisions.59 ' This
included "the load limit clause,"
C5.12#-Use of Roads by Purchaser
All vehicles shall comply with statutory load limits unless a
permit from the Forest Service and any necessary State permits are
obtained prior to overload vehicle use.
"the haul route clause,"
C6.849-Route of Haul
All products removed from Sale Area shall be transported over
the designated routes of haul.
and "the notification clause,"
Purchaser shall notify Forest Service when a load of products,
after leaving Sale Area, will be delayed for more than [twelve]
hours in reaching weighing location.59 4
587. Id. at 707-09.
588. Id. at 707-08.
589. See id. at 706-09 (holding that AECI was the cause of the default because it
"procured and submitted the bonds" that were "later found to be fraudulent and
invalid").
590. 778 F.3d 1026 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
591. Id. at 1028.
592. Id.
593. Id.
594. Id.
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Further, the contract included a termination clause, which stated that
the "Contracting Officer, with the concurrence of the Regional
Forester, may terminate this contract for breach in the event
Purchaser. . . [h] as engaged in a pattern of activity that demonstrates
flagrant disregard for the terms of the contract."5 9 5
Under the contract, EM Logging was required to submit a map and
written. descriptions of its proposed haul route.5 " EM Logging sent a
map, which highlighted the proposed haul route, and written
descriptions of the haul route.9 It also requested an amendment to the
notification clause that it be allowed twenty-four hours to reach weighing
locations." The Forest Service approved the map and written
descriptions, but denied the modification to the notification clause. 9
In the first five months of the contract, the Forest Service issued six
Notifications of Breach, stating that a number of truck loads
exceeded 80,000 pounds gross vehicle weight, that a number of truck
and trailer loads exceeded 84,500 pounds gross vehicle weight, and
that some loads were delayed more than twelve hours in transit
and were transported more than thirteen miles off the approved
haul route.oo Pursuant to the termination clause, the Forest
Service terminated the contract "for repeated and ongoing
disregard for the terms of [the] contract almost from the start of
logging and hauling operations.""
EM Logging appealed to the CBCA, which sustained the
termination in a 2-1 decision.0 2 The CBCA held that EM Logging
breached the "statutory load limits" due to violations of a Forest
Service Order, which prohibited trucks over 80,000 pounds from
traveling on roads in the Kootenai National Forest, and one
violation of Montana state weight limits.0 s Further, the CBCA
held that EM Logging breached the haul route clause and
notification clause by deviating from haul routes and delaying
loads for more than twelve hours.6 4
595. Id. (alteration in original).
596. Id.
597. Id.
598. Id.
599. Id.
600. Id. at 1028-29.
601. Id. at 1029.
602. EM Logging v. Dep't of Agric., CBCA 2397, 2427, 13 BCA 1 35350, at *2.
603. Id.
604. Id. at *10.
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Judge McCann of the CBCA dissented, finding that the
government did not meet its burden of proof that EM Logging had
flagrantly disregarded the contract terms.o5 Judge McCann argued
that a breach of "statutory" load limits only included breaches of state
law, not Forest Service order," and therefore, was only one violation
of the load limits clause.o7 Further, Judge McCann noted that EM
Logging followed the haul route highlighted in the map approved by
the Forest Service." Finally, he found that delays in excess of twelve
hours were warranted, as the Forest Service later realized that a
twelve-hour window was insufficient for transportation." Therefore,
taken together, Judge McCann did not find enough facts to prove a
"flagrant disregard" of the contract terms.6 10 EM Logging appealed
to the Federal Circuit.61'
2. The Federal Circuit's decision
The Federal Circuit interpreted the contract de novo and agreed
with Judge McCann's dissent. The court held that while EM Logging
breached provisions of the contract, the Forest Service did not prove
"flagrant disregard" for contract terms so as to justify termination
under the timber sale contract. 12
The Federal Circuit first looked to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary
and to the contract itself to define "flagrant disregard."6 1 ' The
Dictionary defines "flagrant disregard" as "so obviously inconsistent
with what is right or proper as to appear to be a flouting of law or
morality.""' The contract gave the following examples of "flagrant
disregard" of contract terms: "repeated suspensions for breach pursuant
to B9.3, causing undesignated timber meeting Utilization Standards to
be unnecessarily damaged or negligently or willfully cut, or causing
other serious environmental degradation or resource damage."
The court examined the contract to determine if EM's actions were
in "flagrant disregard" of the contract. The Federal Circuit first
605. Id. at *12 (McCann, J., dissenting).
606. Id. at *13.
607. Id. at *15.
608. Id. at *20.
609. Id.
610. Id.
611. EM Logging v. Dep't of Agric., 778 F.3d 1026, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
612. Id. at 1030, 1033.
613. Id. at 1030-31.
614. Id. at 1030 (citing MERRAM-WEBSIER'S COLLEGATE DICHONAiw'4 75 (11th ed. 2003)).
615. Id. at 1030-31.
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reviewed the alleged violations of the load limit clause, and found
only one."' The Federal Circuit found that the load limit clause,
which precludes violations of "statutory" load limits, did not preclude
violations of a Forest Service order, as the order was not a statute."
The court stated that any such violation of the Forest Service order
was not a breach of the load limit clause.6 1 ' There was only one
violation of a Montana statute, which EM Logging alleged was a
simple mistake, and the court found that this isolated event was not
enough to prove "flagrant disregard" for the contract terms.'
The Federal Circuit similarly did not find a violation of the haul
route, as the Forest Service approved the only deviation from the
highlighted route because the driver's illness necessitated it.6 20 The
driver had to take a detour to see a doctor, who diagnosed him with
bronchia pneumonia. 621 As this was a single extenuating
circumstance, the court found that the Forest Service did not prove
flagrant disregard of this clause. 22
Finally, the court examined the two alleged violations of the
notification clause, which included a thirteen-day delay and a four-
day delay in notifying the Forest Service that deliveries took more
than twelve hours. 2' These deliveries were made within forty-eight
hours. 624 However, both delayed notifications were sent before the
Forest Service notified EM Logging that such delay was
unreasonable. 2' Therefore, the court found that the violations were
too technical to be in flagrant disregard of contract terms. 621
Even analyzing all violations together, the Federal Circuit held that
the Forest Service did not meet its burden of proving that EM
Logging flagrantly disregarded contract terms.6 27
3. Significance
This decision defines the relatively high standard the Forest Service
must meet to prove "flagrant disregard" and terminate a timber sale
616. Id. at 1032.
617. Id.
618. Id.
619. Id. at 1031-32.
620. Id. at 1033.
621. Id. at 1032.
622. Id. at 1033.
623. Id.
624. Id.
625. Id.
626. Id.
627. Id.
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contract.' Under this termination clause, isolated violations of a
number of contract provisions are insufficient for termination.2 9
The Forest Service must prove a pattern of activity, taken together,
that shows a complete disregard of the contract terms.6'
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit issued very few precedential government
contracts decisions in 2015. Decisions were largely issued in
accordance with the lower courts and boards' decisions and were
based on interpretations of established Federal Circuit precedent.
However, whether intended or not, these decisions resulted in
favorable decisions for the government.
As the Federal Circuit moves on to its 2016 docket, it remains to be
seen whether the Federal Circuit will continue to agree with its lower
courts and boards' interpretations of government contracts and defer
to the government.
628. Id. at 1030-31.
629. Id. at 1031-33.
630. Id. at 1028-33.
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